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PINPOINT REDISTRICTING AND THE MINIMIZATION OF 
PARTISAN GERRYMANDERING† 
ABSTRACT 
For over twenty years, the political gerrymandering claim under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment has been mired in ambiguity 
because the Supreme Court and lower courts have failed to come up with a 
clear standard to determine whether a redistricting plan is unconstitutional.  
In 2006, however, a new phenomenon that this Comment terms “pinpoint 
redistricting” was used by Georgia’s Republican-dominated state legislature 
to alter the boundaries of a small group of districts rather than all of the 
state’s district boundaries, severely weakening the strength of Democratic 
voters in the affected districts.  The pinpoint redistricting changed the affected 
districts from competitive to strongly Republican, and as a result, the 
redistricting party’s candidates achieved sizable victories in the 2006 
elections. 
In the context of this novel form of redistricting, this Comment proposes a 
new approach to the political gerrymandering claim.  All of the Supreme 
Court’s previous cases examined political gerrymanders that redrew all of a 
state’s boundaries and addressed the harm to political groups in statewide 
terms.  Pinpoint redistricting’s effect on a limited number of districts should 
allow courts to shift to a district-based approach to judge these gerrymanders.  
Such an approach would be tailored to the facts of pinpoint redistricting, 
drawing from Justice Stevens’s proposal to adapt the Court’s racial 
gerrymandering jurisprudence from the Shaw v. Reno line of cases to the 
political gerrymandering claim, elements of the original political 
gerrymandering standard from Davis v. Bandemer, and Justice Kennedy’s 
elusive view on what would be an applicable standard for certain narrowly 
defined situations.  Under this new standard, an extreme political 
gerrymander, identifiable by the unusual nature of its implementation, would 
be unconstitutional if partisan intent guided every major aspect of drawing the 
new district lines and resulted in active degradation of a political group’s 
electoral strength in a specific district through substantial weakening of the 
 
 † This Comment received the 2008 Mary Laura “Chee” Davis Award for Writing Excellence. 
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group’s political performance in successive elections.  While this standard is 
designed to correct the danger of pinpoint redistricting, it can serve as a model 
for an effective district-based approach to future political gerrymandering 
claims. 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past decade, partisan gerrymandering has made competitive 
legislative elections a rarity.1  Only a small fraction of seats have seen 
meaningful competition in recent elections; the vast majority of elections are 
decided the day the district maps are drawn.2  Partisan gerrymanders, drawn to 
perfection by state legislators, provide a major advantage to the party 
controlling the redistricting process as opposition party politicians find 
themselves running in districts where they could not possibly win,3 and 
friendly incumbents run for reelection in impregnable districts.4  Across the 
political spectrum, observers criticize the practice of partisan gerrymandering 
as a major threat to American democracy,5 allowing those who draw the 
district lines to control the electoral system rather than the people themselves.6 
 
 1 See Sam Hirsch, The United States House of Unrepresentatives: What Went Wrong in the Latest 
Round of Congressional Redistricting, 2 ELECTION L. J. 179, 179 (2003) (calling the round of redistricting 
after the 2000 census “the most incumbent-friendly in modern American history”).  In 2006, only 55 out of 
435 House races were considered competitive.  Ronald A. Klain, Success Changes Nothing: The 2006 Election 
Results and the Undiminished Need for a Progressive Response to Political Gerrymandering, 1 HARV. L. & 
POL’Y REV. 75, 81 (2007). 
 2 See David Lublin & Michael P. McDonald, Is It Time to Draw the Line?: The Impact of Redistricting 
on Competition in State House Elections, 5 ELECTION L. J. 144, 157 (2006) (observing “an overall pattern 
indicating that partisan gerrymandering . . . has a dampening effect on competition”); Erwin Chemerinsky, The 
Kennedy Court: OCTOBER TERM 2005, 9 GREEN BAG 2D 335, 343 (2006) (noting that there are few legislative 
races that are even contested due to gerrymandering). 
 3 See Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab: When Does Gerrymandering Become a Threat to 
Democracy?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 8, 2003, at 63 (describing how a Republican-engineered partisan 
gerrymander in Texas essentially doomed the reelection chances of several veteran Democratic congressmen). 
 4 See Michael S. Kang, The Bright Side of Partisan Gerrymandering, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
443, 446 (2005) (“Incumbents rig their re-election prospects by packing their own districts with friendly 
voters, which scares off or trounces challengers attempting to take their seats.”). 
 5 See Thomas E. Mann, Redistricting Reform: What Is Desirable? Possible?, in PARTY LINES: 
COMPETITION, PARTISANSHIP, AND CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING 92, 92 (Thomas E. Mann & Bruce E. Cain 
eds., 2005) (calling the impact of gerrymandering on recent elections a threat to the “legitimacy of the 
American electoral system” and accusing partisanship in the redistricting process of causing serious problems 
in American democracy); see generally David S. Broder, No Vote Necessary: Redistricting Is Creating a U.S. 
House of Lords, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2004, at A37 (discussing how gerrymandering harms the representative 
nature of the House of Representatives). 
 6 As Justice Stevens wrote, through partisan gerrymanders, “the will of the cartographers rather than the 
will of the people will govern.”  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 331 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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Despite the widespread harmful effects of partisan gerrymandering, the 
Supreme Court’s attempts to restrain excessive partisanship can only be 
described as impotent.7  Since establishing the political gerrymandering claim 
in Davis v. Bandemer in 1986,8 the Court has maintained the option of striking 
down a partisan gerrymander, but it has never exercised that option or even 
articulated a clear standard to guide courts and litigants.9  The culmination of 
the Court’s inaction came in the 2006 LULAC v. Perry decision, when the 
Court declined to strike down an unprecedented and egregiously partisan mid-
decade redistricting in Texas.10  This unfortunate demonstration of the Court’s 
unwillingness to intervene opened the door to more frequent and even more 
partisan gerrymanders.11 
A more subtle incident in 2006, however, marked a crucial development in 
the history of partisan gerrymandering and has the potential to revolutionize 
the judicial approach to this troubled constitutional claim.  Georgia’s Senate 
District 46 was a rare competitive seat in a mostly Republican state;12 the 2004 
election was decided by about 1,800 votes out of over 47,000 cast.13  The 
Republican incumbent had announced he would not run for reelection in 2006, 
and popular Democratic State Representative Jane Kidd announced her 
candidacy for the open seat.14  Before the 2006 election, however,15 the 
Republican-dominated state legislature of Georgia implemented what this 
 
 7 See Nathaniel Persily, Forty Years in the Political Thicket: Judicial Review of the Redistricting 
Process Since Reynolds v. Sims, in PARTY LINES, supra note 5, at 67, 78 (calling the political gerrymandering 
claim “toothless”). 
 8 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 119–27 (1986) (determining that political gerrymandering 
claims are justiciable). 
 9 As one court colorfully put it, “The law regarding political gerrymandering is about as firm as 
marshmallow cream.”  LaPorte County Republican Cent. Comm. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of the County of LaPorte, 
851 F. Supp. 340, 342 (N.D. Ind. 1994). 
 10 See League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 423 (2006) (declining to 
strike down the Texas mid-decade redistricting as unconstitutional); Mitchell N. Berman, Managing 
Gerrymandering, 83 TEX. L. REV. 781, 845–47 (2005) (discussing the “unprecedented” Texas mid-decade 
redistricting and noting that its partisan motivation was “both extreme and avowed”); Pamela S. Karlan, New 
Beginnings and Dead Ends in the Law of Democracy, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 743, 756 (2007) (calling the Texas 
mid-decade redistricting “both procedurally and geographically an ugly piece of work”). 
 11 Persily, supra note 7, at 80. 
 12 See Allison Floyd, Athens Democrat Jane Kidd to Seek State Senate Seat; Brian Kemp Wants to Be 
Agriculture Commissioner; He’ll Give Up Senate Post, FLA. TIMES-UNION, May 21, 2005, at B2 (calling 
District 46 “up for grabs” and “politically balanced”). 
 13 Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *7 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 2006). 
 14 Floyd, supra note 12, at B2. 
 15 Kidd announced her candidacy in May 2005.  Id.  The pinpoint redistricting of Senate District 46 was 
signed into law in March 2006.  Walter C. Jones, Perdue OKs Split of Athens Districts; Democrats Claim the 
Remap Is a Ploy to Help Republican Candidates, FLORIDA TIMES-UNION, Mar. 3, 2006, at B5. 
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Comment calls a “pinpoint redistricting,” a new form of partisan 
gerrymandering that alters an isolated group of districts rather than the entire 
state map.  The Georgia state legislature’s partisan gerrymander affected only 
District 46 and two of its neighboring districts.16  While political 
gerrymandering has had a major impact on state and national politics for 
centuries,17 an isolated gerrymander tailored to affect a political party or 
candidate in a single district was a new phenomenon.  Every previously 
adjudicated political gerrymandering claim, including all of the Supreme 
Court’s prior decisions, addressed a traditional redistricting plan that redrew all 
of a state’s districts.18  The Georgia state legislature minimized the partisan 
gerrymander to change the political character of a single competitive seat.19  
The pinpoint redistricting was successful—in a race where Kidd had a good 
chance to win before the alteration of the district,20 she lost to the Republican 
candidate by a double-digit margin.21 
Pinpoint redistricting represents a serious threat to what little 
competitiveness remains in legislative elections22 because it allows partisan 
actors to thwart any threat to their control of individual seats at any time 
without the attention or accountability to an entire state’s voters, which a 
statewide gerrymander would have.  Despite its devastating potential, however, 
this new form of partisan gerrymandering is ultimately an opportunity for 
courts to develop an effective political gerrymandering standard.  For over 
twenty years, the Supreme Court and lower courts have addressed political 
 
 16 Kidd, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *8. 
 17 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 274–75 (2004) (noting that “[p]olitical gerrymanders are not new 
to the American scene” and discussing the history of gerrymandering stretching back to the founding days of 
our nation); see also DAVID BUTLER & BRUCE CAIN, CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING: COMPARATIVE AND 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 17–40 (1992) (tracing the long and controversial history of redistricting practices 
in the United States from the 1790s to the 1990s); GARY W. COX & JONATHAN N. KATZ, ELBRIDGE GERRY’S 
SALAMANDER: THE ELECTORAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION 3 (2002) (attributing 
the origins of the term “gerrymander” to Massachusetts Governor Elbridge Gerry’s manipulation of districts in 
the early 1800s). 
 18 See generally League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399 (2006) (judging a 
statewide Texas plan); Vieth, 541 U.S. 267 (judging a statewide Pennsylvania plan); Davis v. Bandemer, 478 
U.S. 109 (1986) (judging a statewide Indiana plan); see also Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973) 
(judging a statewide bipartisan gerrymander in Connecticut). 
 19 See Walter C. Jones, GOP Might Miss Power to Remap, FLA. TIMES-UNION, Mar. 5, 2006, at B1 
(observing that the “new lines put a more Republican tilt to District 46”). 
 20 Floyd, supra note 12, at B2. 
 21 Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia Election Results, Official Results of the Tuesday, November 7, 
2006 General Election (Nov. 16, 2006), http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/election_results/2006_1107/075.htm 
(showing election results from State Senate, District 46). 
 22 See supra notes 1–6 and accompanying text. 
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gerrymandering by looking at the statewide impact of a redistricting plan, but 
using this approach, they have failed to establish a clear or meaningful 
standard.23  Pinpoint redistricting, however, only affects distinct and isolated 
districts rather than the entire state.  Therefore, courts should formulate a new, 
district-based standard based on the factual scenario of pinpoint redistricting, 
which can then serve as a model for an effective, judicially manageable 
standard for all political gerrymandering claims.  With the round of 
redistricting following the 2010 census fast approaching, a clear, relevant, and 
innovative approach to modern pinpoint partisan gerrymanders is necessary to 
stem the tide of excessive partisan abuses in drawing district lines. 
Part I of this Comment traces the development of the political 
gerrymandering claim and describes the changing nature of political 
gerrymandering with the appearance of mid-decade redistricting in the 2000s.  
Part II describes the first appearance of pinpoint redistricting in Georgia and its 
likely use elsewhere in the future.  Part III discusses why the traditional 
statewide approach to adjudicating political gerrymandering claims should not 
apply to pinpoint redistricting and argues that a new, district-based standard is 
needed to address pinpoint redistricting effectively.  Part IV draws upon 
existing sources, including a modification of the framework of Davis v. 
Bandemer and an adaptation of the Shaw v. Reno line of cases to partisan 
gerrymandering, to formulate a district-based standard.  It ultimately proposes 
a new standard for political gerrymandering claims based on the facts of 
pinpoint redistricting and addresses discrimination in an individual district.  
This new approach can provide a template for an effective district-based 
standard for all future political gerrymandering claims. 
I. BROAD FOUNDATIONS: THE TRADITIONAL STATEWIDE APPROACH TO 
POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING CLAIMS 
Political gerrymandering is the manipulation of electoral districts by 
elected officials to give the redistricting party an unfair advantage over the 
opposition party.24  This is done by deliberately drawing districts to dilute the 
 
 23 See Aaron Brooks, The Court’s Missed Opportunity to Draw the Line on Partisan Gerrymandering: 
LULAC v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594 (2006), 30 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 781, 781–82 (2007) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s failure to establish a standard in three different cases). 
 24 COX & KATZ, supra note 17, at 18.  One of the earliest judicial definitions of political gerrymandering 
was provided by Justice Fortas: “the deliberate and arbitrary distortion of district boundaries and populations 
for partisan or personal political purposes.”  Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 538 (1969) (Fortas, J., 
concurring).  Justice Scalia, taking his definition from Black’s Law Dictionary, defined political 
WHITMAN GALLEYSFINAL 10/30/2009  3:11:55 PM 
216 EMORY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 59 
power of the opposing party, often by grouping a large number of members of 
one political party into a small number of districts to limit their victories 
(known as “packing”) or spreading a political party’s members across a 
number of districts to deny them a chance of winning in as many districts as 
possible (known as “cracking”).25  In the landmark 1964 decision of Reynolds 
v. Sims, the Supreme Court established the “one-person, one-vote” standard, 
which prescribes that, under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, all legislative districts are required to represent approximately 
equal numbers of people to ensure that each person’s vote has equal value.26  
Reynolds required all state legislatures to redraw congressional and state 
legislative districts’ boundaries upon the release of new census numbers at the 
beginning of each decade.27  During this “Reapportionment Revolution,”28 
however, state legislators controlling the redistricting process inevitably 
injected partisan and personal political goals into drawing new district 
boundaries,29 resulting in partisan gerrymanders heavily skewed in favor of the 
party that created the plan.30 
Partisan gerrymandering was criticized for decades after Reynolds,31 but the 
round of redistricting after the 2000 census truly demonstrated its detrimental 
influence on American legislative elections.32  As the partisan bent of the post-
 
gerrymandering as “[t]he practice of dividing a geographical area into electoral districts, often of highly 
irregular shape, to give one political party an unfair advantage by diluting the opposition’s voting strength.”  
Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 271 n.1 (quoting BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 696 (7th ed. 1999)). 
 25 Michael D. McDonald & Richard L. Engstrom, Detecting Gerrymandering, in POLITICAL 
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS 178, 178–79 (Bernard Grofman ed., 1990). 
 26 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 558, 561–63 (1964).  Reynolds showed that if one district contained 
far fewer voters than another, the votes of individuals in the first district would be more meaningful than the 
votes of individuals in a more populous district.  The Court held that under the Equal Protection Clause, each 
person’s vote must count equally, and therefore districts should have equal populations.  Id. 
 27 See Richard L. Engstrom, The Political Thicket, Electoral Reform, and Minority Voting Rights, in FAIR 
AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION? DEBATING ELECTORAL REFORM AND MINORITY RIGHTS 3, 7 (Mark E. Rush 
& Richard L. Engstrom eds., 2001) (“New census figures almost always reveal that districts no longer satisfy 
this [one-person, one-vote] requirement and therefore need to be rearranged.”). 
 28 COX & KATZ, supra note 17, at 12. 
 29 See Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 753 (1973) (“Politics and political considerations are 
inseparable from districting and apportionment.”). 
 30 See COX & KATZ, supra note 17, at 18–19 (describing partisan gerrymanders after Reynolds that 
“maximize[d] the gain of the redistricting party”). 
 31 See BUTLER & CAIN, supra note 17, at 36–39 (discussing the controversy associated with the role of 
partisanship in redistricting in the 1970s and 1980s); McDonald & Engstrom, supra note 25, at 178 (calling 
gerrymandering “a noxious political practice”). 
 32 See Mann, supra note 5, at 92 (citing the post-2000 redistricting cycle as promoting the “maladies in 
American democracy,” which include “an unusually high degree of incumbent safety, a precipitous decline in 
competitiveness, growing ideological polarization, and a fierce struggle between the major parties to 
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2000 gerrymanders strengthened, the competitiveness of legislative elections 
declined to the point that genuinely competitive districts became rare.33  In 
2004, for example, only 5 of the 401 incumbents running for reelection to the 
House of Representatives were defeated.34  Intertwined with the issue of 
competitiveness is the extensive use of sophisticated computer models,35 which 
allow state legislators to create district maps incredibly attuned to political, 
racial, and socio-economic patterns and interests.36  As partisan 
gerrymandering became more pervasive, this technology was crucial in 
determining the outcomes of elections.37  Despite considerable public outcry38 
and widespread criticism of partisan gerrymandering,39 legal challenges to 
partisan gerrymandering have thus far been completely unsuccessful.40 
This Part provides an overview of the legal foundations of the political 
gerrymandering claim, first tracing the Supreme Court’s development of the 
political gerrymandering claim, then discussing the onset of mid-decade 
redistricting in the 2000s, which shattered the custom of limiting redistricting 
to the beginning of a decade and permitted the advent of pinpoint redistricting. 
 
manipulate the rules of the game to achieve, maintain, or enlarge majority control of the [House of 
Representatives]”). 
 33 See Kang, supra note 4, at 446 (“The proportion of House races decided by competitive margins was 
lower in 2002 and 2004 than in any other election years during the postwar period.”). 
 34 Id. 
 35 See Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 343 (“With increasingly sophisticated computer programs to draw 
safe districts, there are few contested races for seats in the House of Representatives and many state 
legislatures.”). 
 36 See MARK MONMONIER, BUSHMANDERS & BULLWINKLES: HOW POLITICIANS MANIPULATE 
ELECTRONIC MAPS AND CENSUS DATA TO WIN ELECTIONS 104–20 (2001) (describing the astounding 
capabilities of computer programs in drawing maps of electoral districts). 
 37 See David G. Savage, High Court Upholds Texas Redistricting, L.A. TIMES, June 29, 2006, at A1 (“In 
recent decades, computers have given politicians an ever more powerful tool to shape the outcome of elections 
by shifting voters among districts.”). 
 38 See, e.g., Bruce E. Cain et al., From Equality to Fairness: The Path of Political Reform Since Baker v. 
Carr, in PARTY LINES, supra note 5, at 6, 17 (“Following the 2001 round [of redistricting], political observers 
from across the political spectrum . . . denounced the power of district boundaries to predetermine election 
outcomes.”). 
 39 See Christopher J. Roederer, The Noble Business of “Incumbantocracy:” A Response to The Sordid 
Business of Democracy, 34 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 373, 389 (2008) (arguing that partisan gerrymandering 
“undermine[s] citizen participation and republican self governance”); Hirsch, supra note 1, at 215 (contending 
that partisan gerrymandering is “threatening to transform what should be our most dynamically democratic 
institution [the House of Representatives] into something sclerotic and skewed”). 
 40 See infra Parts I.A and I.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s political gerrymandering cases). 
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A. Political Gerrymandering and the Supreme Court: Looking at the Big 
Picture 
Despite the prominent role of political gerrymandering in American 
politics, the Supreme Court’s approach to claims of partisan gerrymandering 
has doomed any legal challenge’s chance of success.  The Court first 
recognized the political gerrymandering claim under the Equal Protection 
Clause in the 1986 decision of Davis v. Bandemer.41  In that case, Indiana’s 
Republican-controlled General Assembly passed a redistricting plan following 
the 1980 census, which gave their party a significant advantage.42  Democratic 
candidates received 51.9% of Indiana’s votes for state house seats in the 1982 
elections, but as a result of the redistricting, only 43 Democrats were elected 
out of 100 seats.43  Several Indiana Democrats filed suit, claiming that the 
Republicans had instituted an unconstitutional political gerrymander that 
discriminated against Indiana Democrats as a political group.44 
Justice White, writing for the majority, declared that political 
gerrymandering claims were justiciable45 over Justice O’Connor’s objection 
that political gerrymandering is a nonjusticiable political question.46  Political 
groups, like racial groups, have the right to elect representatives of their 
choice, free from unconstitutional discrimination.47  A violation of the Equal 
Protection Clause occurs if the group implementing a gerrymander gains 
enough of an unfair advantage over the political process.48  However, the Court 
ruled that the discrimination against the Indiana Democrats was not 
“sufficiently adverse” to declare the Republican partisan gerrymander 
unconstitutional.49  Justice White established that a plaintiff must prove “both 
intentional discrimination against an identifiable political group and an actual 
discriminatory effect on that group” to find a political gerrymander 
unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.50  White noted that it was 
 
 41 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 42 Id. at 113. 
 43 Id. at 115. 
 44 Bandemer v. Davis, 603 F. Supp. 1479, 1482 (S.D. Ind. 1984). 
 45 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 119–21. 
 46 See infra notes 180–183 and accompanying text (discussing Justice O’Connor’s concurrence). 
 47 See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 124–25 (establishing that claims brought by political groups alleging 
unconstitutional discrimination are justiciable). 
 48 Charles Backstrom et al., Establishing a Statewide Electoral Effects Baseline, in POLITICAL 
GERRYMANDERING AND THE COURTS, supra note 25, at 145, 148. 
 49 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 129. 
 50 Id. at 127. 
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fairly easy to satisfy the discriminatory intent prong,51 but, as observed by 
Mark Rush, “[r]egardless of the motivations of the legislators who drew the 
district lines, results are the key component of an unconstitutional 
gerrymander.”52  White stated that “unconstitutional discrimination occurs only 
when the electoral system is arranged in a manner that will consistently 
degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a 
whole.”53 White further explained that “such a finding of unconstitutionality 
must be supported by evidence of continued frustration of the will of a 
majority of the voters or effective denial to a minority of voters of a fair chance 
to influence the political process.”54 
Bandemer thus established a heavy burden for a plaintiff to overcome to 
prove discriminatory effect.55  While the Court took the important step of 
allowing litigants to bring political gerrymandering claims, the Court’s 
standard was so difficult to satisfy that there was, in Professor Samuel 
Issacharoff’s words, “virtually no meaningful application.”56  Litigants and 
lower courts found Bandemer notoriously difficult to interpret; Issacharoff 
wrote that the test “seemed designed to be impossible to apply.”57  Over the 
next eighteen years, no federal court, at any level, ruled that a redistricting plan 
was an unconstitutional political gerrymander.58  When the Court granted 
certiorari to hear Vieth v. Jubelirer, a political gerrymandering claim out of 
Pennsylvania during the 2003–2004 term, many critics of the extreme use of 
partisanship in redistricting saw the case as an opportunity for the Court to 
 
 51 See id. at 129 (“As long as redistricting is done by a legislature, it should not be very difficult to prove 
that the likely political consequences of the reapportionment were intended.”). 
 52 MARK E. RUSH, DOES REDISTRICTING MAKE A DIFFERENCE?: PARTISAN REPRESENTATION AND 
ELECTORAL BEHAVIOR 4–5 (Lexington Books 2000) (1993) (emphasis in original). 
 53 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 132. 
 54 Id. at 133. 
 55 Justice White himself acknowledged that courts and plaintiffs would not have an easy time finding a 
political gerrymander to be unconstitutional, noting, “We recognize that our own view may be difficult of 
application.  Determining when an electoral system has been ‘arranged in a manner that will consistently 
degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the political process as a whole’ is of necessity a difficult 
inquiry.”  Id. at 142–43 (citation omitted). 
 56 Samuel Issacharoff, Gerrymandering and Political Cartels, 116 HARV. L. REV. 593, 598 (2002). 
 57 Samuel Issacharoff, Supreme Court Destabilization of Single-Member Districts, 1995 U. CHI. LEGAL 
F. 205, 235 (1995). 
 58 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 280 n.6 (2004) (listing cases dismissing political gerrymandering 
claims).  The only case that ever actually found an unconstitutional political gerrymander was reversed 
because Republican candidates succeeded in districts they claimed were gerrymandered against them five days 
after the lower court’s decision.  Republican Party of N.C. v. Hunt, No. 94-2410, 1996 U.S. App. LEXIS 2029, 
at *13 (4th Cir. Feb. 12, 1996) (per curiam). 
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finally clarify its earlier decision.59  Instead, Vieth nearly marked the death of 
the political gerrymandering claim.60 
In Vieth, several Pennsylvania Democratic voters filed a lawsuit alleging 
that the Republican-dominated state legislature’s heavily partisan 2001 
congressional redistricting plan, which resulted in twelve Republicans being 
elected to nineteen seats, was an unconstitutional political gerrymander.61  
Relying on the Supreme Court’s decision in Bandemer, the District Court 
granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the political gerrymandering claim, 
and the plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court.62  Justice Scalia, writing for a 
plurality of the Court, criticized Bandemer’s creation of a cause of action for 
political gerrymandering and declared that “no judicially discernible and 
manageable standards for adjudicating political gerrymandering claims have 
emerged.”63  Basing his decision on the subsequent history of the political 
gerrymandering claim and significant criticism of the Court’s leap into the 
political thicket, Scalia concluded that Bandemer was wrongly decided and 
that political gerrymandering claims were nonjusticiable.64  Four Justices 
dissented, including Justice Stevens, who proposed adapting the Court’s 
examination of individual districts in its racial gerrymandering jurisprudence to 
political gerrymandering claims.65 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence represented the deciding vote.66  Although 
he agreed with the Justice Scalia’s plurality that the Pennsylvania gerrymander 
was constitutional, he sided with Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and 
Souter on the issue of justiciability, writing, “I would not foreclose all 
possibility of judicial relief if some limited and precise rationale were found to 
correct an established violation of the Constitution in some redistricting 
 
 59 See Toobin, supra note 3, at 65 (calling the then-upcoming Vieth decision the “one chance to change 
the cycle” of extreme partisan gerrymandering). 
 60 See Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *44 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 
2006) (“Vieth comes close to establishing that political gerrymandering cases are not justiciable.”). 
 61 Kang, supra note 4, at 448. 
 62 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 272–73. 
 63 Id. at 281. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. at 327 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Racial gerrymandering is the use of packing and cracking to 
distribute minority voters into specific districts.  The Court began looking at individual districts that plaintiffs 
alleged to be racial gerrymanders in the 1990s.  E.g., Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).  Justice Stevens’s 
proposal to take a cue from this approach in terms of partisan gerrymandering is discussed infra Part IV.A. 
 66 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring); Richard L. Hasen, No Exit? The Roberts Court and 
the Future of Election Law, 57 S.C. L. REV. 669, 682–83 (2006). 
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cases.”67  While far from an enthusiastic endorsement of striking down partisan 
gerrymanders, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence nonetheless kept the political 
gerrymandering cause of action alive in the hope that proper judicially 
manageable standards for an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander might yet 
be discovered.68  Unfortunately, Kennedy did not provide a standard in his 
opinion, and the political gerrymandering claim remained mired in 
ambiguity.69 
B. Shock to the System: The Rise of Mid-Decade Redistricting 
The appearance of mid-decade redistricting in the early 2000s brought “a 
sudden shock to the ritual of redistricting politics.”70  The traditional custom of 
only redistricting at the beginning of a decade upon the release of new census 
numbers abruptly changed after the 2002 elections,71 when Republican state 
legislators in Texas and Colorado proposed implementing new congressional 
redistricting plans that heavily favored Republicans less than two years after 
traditional decennial plans had been applied.72  While the Colorado plan was 
overturned by the Colorado Supreme Court,73 the fierce political battle over the 
more successful Texas gerrymander attracted national attention.74 
The Texas Republicans’ mid-decade redistricting, passed in 2003 after 
months of partisan jockeying, threats, stalemate, and Democratic legislators 
 
 67 Vieth, 541 U.S. at 306 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 68 See id. at 309–10 (“It is not in our tradition to foreclose the judicial process from the attempt to define 
standards and remedies where it is alleged that a constitutional right is burdened or denied.”); see also ERWIN 
CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 138 (3d ed. 2006) (noting that the view on 
political gerrymandering claims post-Vieth, as per Justice Kennedy’s controlling opinion, is that “when 
standards are developed, such cases can be heard”).  Interestingly, Justice Kennedy recognized the merits of 
the arguments against allowing the justiciability of political gerrymandering claims, even conceding that 
“those arguments may prevail in the long run.”  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 309 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 69 See Kang, supra note 4, at 444 (noting that the Court in Vieth “failed again to decide upon a 
meaningful standard for such [partisan gerrymandering] claims”). 
 70 Adam Cox, Partisan Fairness and Redistricting Politics, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 751, 751 (2004). 
 71 See Mann, supra note 5, at 92 (noting that mid-decade redistricting “violated a century-long norm 
against undertaking more than one round of redistricting after each decennial census”). 
 72 Juliet Eilperin, GOP’s New Push on Redistricting; House Gains Are at Stake in Colo., Tex., WASH. 
POST, May 9, 2003, at A4. 
 73 People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1237–40 (Colo. 2003) (finding mid-decade 
redistricting unconstitutional under the Colorado Constitution). 
 74 The Texas re-redistricting was a saga that had its roots in decades of Texas politics, culminating with 
the Republican ascendancy in that state in the early 2000s.  The story of the redistricting is one of the most 
colorful, fascinating, and brutally partisan tales in American political history.  For an excellent account of what 
happened in Texas, see STEVE BICKERSTAFF, LINES IN THE SAND: CONGRESSIONAL REDISTRICTING IN TEXAS 
AND THE DOWNFALL OF TOM DELAY (2007). 
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fleeing the state to prevent a quorum,75 radically changed the complexion of 
the state’s congressional delegation.  The 2002 elections produced seventeen 
Democrats and fifteen Republicans; after the 2004 elections, Texas sent eleven 
Democrats and twenty-one Republicans to Washington.76  A federal district 
court rejected a legal challenge asserting that the mid-decade redistricting was 
an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander,77 and the plaintiffs appealed to the 
Supreme Court.  In 2006, the Court held in LULAC that the Republicans’ mid-
decade redistricting was not an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.78 
The plaintiffs in LULAC unsuccessfully argued that the Court could finally 
formulate a standard for judging political gerrymanders based on the facts of 
the Texas mid-decade redistricting.  The plaintiffs contended that the fact that 
the gerrymander was done mid-decade justified a presumption of invalidity 
due to its unusual timing and clearly partisan intent.79  A ban on mid-decade 
redistricting would have the advantage of simplicity, allowing a court to avoid 
the tricky question of proving discriminatory effect that had plagued the 
political gerrymandering claim since Bandemer.80  As Justice Kennedy put it, 
the plaintiffs’ proposed solution would “challenge[] the decision to redistrict at 
all.”81 
Despite a series of facts showing the most outrageous known partisan 
gerrymander to date,82 Justice Kennedy declined to use the facts of LULAC as 
the basis for a clear standard for an unconstitutional political gerrymander.  
Justice Kennedy first rejected the appellants’ proposed standard that mid-
decade gerrymanders with the “sole motivation” of partisanship should be 
 
 75 Id. at 141–43. 
 76 League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 412, 413 (2006).  While some 
increase in Republican representation in Texas’s congressional delegation was perhaps justified, “Texas 
Republicans and Democrats privately agree[d] a fair map would produce eighteen Republican and fourteen 
Democratic seats.”  JULIET EILPERIN, FIGHT CLUB POLITICS: HOW PARTISANSHIP IS POISONING THE HOUSE OF 
REPRESENTATIVES 104 (2006). 
 77 LULAC, 548 U.S. at 409. 
 78 Id. at 423. 
 79 Id. at 417. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. 
 82 The League of United Latin American Citizens’ brief included evidence of extreme partisanship in the 
redistricting process, including clear statements by Republican leaders indicating the sole partisan intent of the 
mid-decade redistricting; Republican leaders abandoning the long-standing traditions of the Texas state 
legislature to pass the plan; specific targeting of no less than seven Democratic congressmen for defeat; 
shifting over eight million Texas voters into new districts; and creating numerous bizarrely shaped districts 
that split up even more counties than the previous plan.  Appellant’s Brief on the Merits at 6–10, LULAC, 548 
U.S. at 399, No. 05-204; see also supra text accompanying notes 74–76. 
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unconstitutional.83  He then refused to declare that mid-decade redistricting 
was presumptively unconstitutional, arguing that, under such a theory, “a 
highly effective partisan gerrymander that coincided with decennial 
redistricting would receive less scrutiny than a bumbling, yet solely partisan, 
mid-decade redistricting.”84  Kennedy further indicated that an outright ban on 
mid-decade redistricting could “encourage partisan excess at the outset of the 
decade” because a “sole motivation” standard would only apply to mid-decade 
redistricting claims.85  Once again, Justice Kennedy declined to set his own 
standard based on the facts of LULAC,86 allowing perhaps the most partisan 
redistricting plan ever before a court to stand.87 
LULAC demonstrated the Court’s reluctance to truly commit to combating 
partisan gerrymandering.88  Although presented with an opportunity to 
establish a clear standard based on the unique facts of a severely partisan 
redistricting that was outside the decennial redistricting cycle, the Court once 
again declined to intervene.89  The effect of the Court’s decision was 
psychological as well as political; state legislators could conclude that the 
courts would not intervene as long as they did not go as far as the Texas mid-
decade redistricting did.  The Court’s failure to act prompted “an escalation in 
partisan warfare.”90  Several state legislatures redistricted their own 
boundaries,91 and Georgia Republicans instituted a mid-decade congressional 
redistricting of their own.92  Democrats threatened to retaliate by redistricting 
the congressional boundaries of states where they controlled the state 
 
 83 LULAC, 548 U.S. at 417–20. 
 84 Id. at 419.  Kennedy believed that it would be unfair to strike down the 2003 Republican partisan 
gerrymander as unconstitutional while preserving the 1991 Democratic gerrymander that had served as the 
basis for the traditional decennial plan and was significantly partisan as well.  Id. 
 85 Id. at 420. 
 86 Id. at 423. 
 87 See Berman, supra note 10 at 844–45, 848–49 (calling the Texas mid-decade redistricting a “textbook 
example” of a gerrymander implemented with “unconstitutionally excessive partisanship”). 
 88 See Karlan, supra note 10, at 763 (commenting that the Court “remains unwilling or unable” to 
intervene on behalf of political groups that allege they have been discriminated against). 
 89 See Scot Powe & Steve Bickerstaff, Anthony Kennedy’s Blind Quest, 105 MICH. L. REV. FIRST 
IMPRESSIONS 63, 63 (2006), http://students.law.umich.edu/mlr/firstimpressions/vol105/powe.pdf (“When far 
superior tests [to those rejected by Kennedy in Vieth] were offered in LULAC, he rejected them too.”). 
 90 See Savage, supra note 36, at A1. 
 91 Michael P. McDonald, Supreme Court Lets the Politicians Run Wild, ROLL CALL, June 29, 2006, at 4. 
 92 Tom Baxter & Sonji Jacobs, Legislature ‘05: Senate OKs New Map for Congress; Proposed Districts 
Favor GOP; Senate Approves Congressional Map, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Mar. 22, 2005, at 1B. 
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legislature and governor’s office,93 though none of the proposals came to 
fruition.94  The reluctance of the Court to make good on Justice White’s 
contention that political groups are entitled to protection under the Equal 
Protection Clause95 resulted in outrageous levels of partisanship in drawing 
district lines, culminating in perhaps the most unique and distinctly partisan 
form of political gerrymandering to date: pinpoint redistricting. 
II. MINIMIZING THE GERRYMANDER: THE 2006 GEORGIA PINPOINT 
REDISTRICTING 
Now that the Supreme Court has established that mid-decade redistricting 
is not necessarily unconstitutional, political operatives have the ability to 
explore more options in the fight for partisan dominance of state legislatures 
and congressional delegations.  Nathaniel Persily observed that “the recent 
Texas re-redistricting has demonstrated[] [that] judicial noninvolvement in this 
area has left majority parties with the feeling that they can redraw districts to 
their advantage with abandon.”96  Persily’s prediction was most obviously 
fulfilled in 2006 when Georgia’s state legislature introduced the political world 
to pinpoint redistricting. 
Pinpoint redistricting is localized mid-decade redistricting; it is a form of 
political gerrymandering that affects only a small number of districts rather 
than redrawing the entire map.  Pinpoint redistricting adjusts an existing map 
in an isolated area to advantage or disadvantage a candidate’s or political 
party’s strength in a single district.97  Pinpoint redistricting is reactionary; 
drawing upon evidence of past election results, political developments, or 
 
 93 See, e.g., EILPERIN, supra note 76, at 107 (noting that the Republicans’ Texas maneuver and efforts in 
Colorado and Georgia left Democrats “spoiling for a fight in states like Illinois, Louisiana, New Mexico, and 
New York, where they’ve gained political ground since the start of the decade”). 
 94 See Charles Babington, Democrats Not Eager to Emulate Texas’s Redistricting, WASH. POST, July 5, 
2006, at A7 (observing that, although the LULAC decision presented Democrats with their own opportunity to 
redistrict mid-decade, “early indications are that Democrats will probably resist the temptation to do unto 
Republicans as Republicans did unto them”).  Several well-known Democrats fiercely but unsuccessfully 
advocated redrawing districts in their favor, including former Illinois Congressman and current White House 
Chief of Staff Rahm Emanuel.  Id. 
 95 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 124–25 (1986). 
 96 Persily, supra note 7, at 80. 
 97 The pinpoint redistricting of Georgia State Senate District 46, discussed below, was an example of 
targeting a single candidate.  See Justin Levitt & Michael P. McDonald, Taking the “Re” Out of Redistricting: 
State Constitutional Provisions on Redistricting Timing, 95 GEO. L.J. 1247, 1276 n.150 (2007) (“Three senate 
districts in the Athens area were redrawn to fragment Democratic voters after a Democratic representative 
announced her candidacy for an open seat.”). 
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emerging voter trends, it responds to a party’s weakness in a single district.98  
This Part first discusses the Georgia General Assembly’s 2006 pinpoint 
redistricting of Georgia State Senate Districts 46, 47, and 49 and 8 of 
Georgia’s 180 State House Districts, focusing on the formerly competitive 
District 48, and subsequently analyzes the effects of pinpoint redistricting on 
the political process and its potential use in the future by partisan state 
legislators. 
A. Senate Bill 386: Pinpoint Redistricting and Senate District 46 
The first challenged instance of pinpoint redistricting was seen in Georgia 
prior to the 2006 elections.  Georgia’s Senate District 46 was a competitive 
district, containing the Democratic stronghold of the city of Athens, Georgia, 
home to the University of Georgia.99  The 2004 election in District 46 was 
extremely tight; incumbent Republican State Senator Brian Kemp barely 
defeated his Democratic opponent, Becky Vaughn, with 51.6% of the vote to 
her 48.4%.100  The competitive nature of this district changed, however, in 
January 2006 when the Republican-dominated Georgia State Senate passed 
Senate Bill 386, which altered the boundaries of Districts 46, 47, and 49101 in 
what Georgia’s Democratic Party called a “naked power grab.”102 
 
 98 See infra Part II.A (discussing how the Georgia state legislature’s pinpoint redistricting of Senate 
District 46 was a reaction to the district’s classification as competitive in the previous election). 
 99 Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *5, *10 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 
2006). 
 100 Id. at *7. 
 101 Id. at *8. 
 102 Sonji Jacobs, Legislature 2006: In Brief, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Jan. 13, 2006, at D6. 
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Figure 1: Georgia Senate Districts 46, 47, and 49 in 2004 
 
Source: Georgia Redistricting Services Office, Carl Vinson Institute of Government, 
Atlanta, Georgia. 
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Figure 2: Georgia Senate Districts 46, 47, and 49 in 2006 
 
Source: Georgia Redistricting Services Office, Carl Vinson Institute of Government, 
Atlanta, Georgia. 
Figure 1 shows the Georgia Senate Districts in 2004.  District 46 consisted 
of a small part of Madison County and all of Oglethorpe, Oconee, and Clarke 
Counties.103  District 47 consisted of all of Barrow County, large portions of 
Walton, Elbert, and Jackson Counties, and the remaining part of Madison 
County.104  District 49 consisted of Hall County and a small part of Jackson 
County.105  Figure 2 shows the boundaries after the passage of Senate Bill 386 
in 2006.  Major changes were made to Districts 46 and 47; most importantly, 
the pinpoint redistricting split Clarke County between Districts 46 and 47,106 
diluting the strength of the county’s solid Democratic base.107  The only whole 
 
 103 See supra fig.1.  Clarke County includes the entire city of Athens. 
 104 See supra fig.1. 
 105 See supra fig.1. 
 106 See supra fig.2. 
 107 See Brandon Larrabee, Task Force Proposes Commission, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov. 15, 2006, at 6B 
(noting that, before the pinpoint redistricting, “Clarke County was the center of a district that tilted 
Democratic”). 
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county in District 46 is now Oconee County, and the remainder of the District 
contains the part of Walton County that was formerly in District 47.108  District 
47 now contains the other half of Clarke County and all of Barrow, Madison, 
and Oglethorpe Counties and retains the portions of Elberth and Jackson 
Counties that were included prior to 2006.109  Minor changes were made to 
District 49—mostly miniscule gains of territory around I-85’s route through 
Jackson County.110 
Senate Bill 386 changed the political complexion of District 46 from 
competitive to Republican-leaning.111  The Democratic core of the district in 
Clarke County, including Athens and the University of Georgia, was split 
directly in half, severely diluting the electoral strength of District 46’s potential 
Democratic voters.112  While the Republicans defended the boundary 
adjustment as a legitimate move uniting Madison County and increasing 
Athens’s representation in the State Senate, it was strongly opposed by 
Democrats and advocacy groups, such as Common Cause Georgia, who “felt it 
was enacted only for the purpose of increasing the chances of keeping these 
three seats in Republican hands.”113  By splitting the Democratic-leaning 
Clarke County into two districts, the gerrymander directly harmed Democratic 
State Representative Jane Kidd’s bid for the Senate seat, which was being 
vacated by the Republican incumbent.114  Kidd, who had defeated the 
Republican candidate, Bill Cowsert, in a State House race in 2004 and was 
considered a strong candidate for the seat, was reported as the “primary target 
 
 108 See supra fig.2. 
 109 See supra fig.2. 
 110 See supra fig.2. 
 111 See Tom Crawford, Senate Republicans Redraw Three Districts, GA. REP., Jan. 9, 2006, http://www. 
ciclt.net/garpt/main.asp?PT=n_detail&Client=garpt&N_ID=400918 (on file with author) (observing that the 
redistricting would make “District 46, which is now a competitive district up for grabs between Democrats and 
Republicans, a more Republican-leaning district in terms of voter performance in recent elections”). 
 112 See Larrabee, supra note 107, at 6B (describing Senate Bill 386 as “dividing Clarke County [the center 
of a district that tilted Democratic] between two Republican leaning Senate districts”); Jones, supra note 15, at 
B5 (summarizing the Democratic view of the bill “as a GOP ploy to place more Republican-leaning voters in 
[Districts 46 and 47] by diluting with a split the more liberal area of the University of Georgia-influenced 
county of Clarke”). 
 113 The 2006 Georgia State Senate Races, http://www.commoncause.org/atf/cf/%7B8A2D1D15-C65A-
46D4-8CBB-2073440751B5%7D/The%202006%20Senate%20Races_1.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009); see 
also Brandon Larrabee, Dems, Watchdogs Decry Redistricting, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD, Feb. 5, 2006, at D3 
(“Supporters say the proposal would place all of the less-populous Madison County into one Senate district; 
opponents say it is a thinly-veiled attempt to hurt state Rep. Jane Kidd, D-Athens, in her bid to succeed state 
Sen. Brian Kemp, an Athens Republican expected to run for agriculture commissioner.”). 
 114 Jacobs, supra note 102, at D6. 
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of the map change.”115  Cracking the Democratic stronghold in Clarke County 
produced very favorable results for Republicans in the 2006 general election.  
Cowsert116 defeated Kidd by a margin of 11.4% (55.7% to 44.3%),117 far 
greater than the 3.2% margin of defeat for the Democratic candidate in District 
46 in 2004, before the pinpoint redistricting had been implemented. 
Kidd filed a lawsuit in federal court challenging the pinpoint redistricting 
shortly after Senate Bill 386 was passed, alleging an unconstitutional partisan 
gerrymander, violation of the one-person, one-vote standard, and violation of 
the Georgia constitution.118  The three-judge panel that heard the case ruled 
against Kidd and upheld the plan instituted by Senate Bill 386,119 but did not 
address (and the plaintiff apparently did not argue) the issue of making 
individual changes to a districting plan.120  In fact, it seems that the plaintiffs 
did not have much faith in the political gerrymandering claim at all; the court 
noted that the plaintiffs “[did] not make a distinct political gerrymandering 
claim in their complaint” and that the issue was raised only during arguments 
before the court.121  While a pinpoint redistricting for partisan advantage took 
place, there was never a significant legal battle over its constitutionality, and 
no federal appellate court had the opportunity to address the issue.122 
 
 115 Tom Baxter, Athens’ New State Senate Lines OK’d, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Apr. 21, 2006, at D3; see 
also Bill Shipp, Editorial, Assessing Kidd’s Chances for Leading Democrats in Georgia, ATHENS BANNER-
HERALD, Jan. 3, 2007, at A6 (observing that District 46 was “openly gerrymandered to end Kidd’s political 
career”).  Mark Monmonier called similar gerrymandering practices that targeted a specific candidate 
“cartoassassination.”  MONMONIER, supra note 36, at 95. 
 116 The fact that Cowsert was the Republican candidate suggests a nepotistic motivation for redrawing the 
lines.  Cowsert had run against Kidd for her State House seat in 2004 and lost by a fairly wide margin—56% 
to 44%.  Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *7 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 
2006).  Cowsert intended to run against Kidd again for the District 46 State Senate seat in 2006 upon the 
retirement of the incumbent, Senator Brian Kemp.  Walter C. Jones, GOP Blunders Not Helping Perdue; 
Governor Shows Signs of Frustration, FLA. TIMES UNION, Feb. 5, 2006, at B1.  Kemp, a supporter of Senate 
Bill 386, was Cowsert’s brother-in-law.  Kidd, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *7. 
 117 Georgia Secretary of State, supra note 21. 
 118 Kidd, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *2, *11. 
 119 Id. at *59. 
 120 The plaintiffs apparently focused much of their argument on one-person, one-vote and First 
Amendment grounds, as the court noted that the plaintiffs only raised their Equal Protection partisan 
gerrymandering claim in oral argument, not in their complaint.  Id. at *2.  The court did not discuss the issue of 
the changes being a pinpointed, isolated redistricting. 
 121 Id. at *40. 
 122 The court did address the issue that the redistricting was in the middle of the decade, but based its 
decision to dismiss Kidd’s complaint on Georgia’s State Constitution.  Id. at *34–*39 (interpreting the Georgia 
Constitution as not limiting redistricting to following each census).  In a subsequent related proceeding, the 
Supreme Court of Georgia came to a similar conclusion.  See Blum v. Schrader, 637 S.E.2d 396, 399 (Ga. 
2006) (declaring that the frequency of reapportionment is a matter of legislative discretion and that the Georgia 
Constitution does not limit the state legislature’s ability to redistrict to once a decade). 
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B. House Bill 1137: Pinpoint Redistricting and House District 48 
The Georgia House executed a similar pinpoint redistricting of several of 
its own districts in 2006.  House Bill 1137 adjusted the boundaries of eight of 
Georgia’s 180 House districts, leaving the rest of the map intact.123  Democrats 
accused the Republican majority of targeting these districts to affect upcoming 
elections by strengthening the Republican incumbents in those districts.124  
Critics of the bill specifically cited House District 48,125 which provides a good 
example of the direct effect of this pinpoint redistricting when comparing the 
results of successive elections.  Democrat Jan Hackney had lost to incumbent 
Republican Representative Harry Geisinger in 2004 by a margin of 53.4% to 
46.6%.126  In 2006, widely regarded as a good year for Democrats,127 a rematch 
between Hackney and Geisinger under the redrawn district, District 48, 
resulted in a victory for Geisinger by a much wider margin of 59.1% to 
40.9%.128  The pinpoint redistricting achieved the Republicans’ objective of 
securing the seat of a potentially vulnerable Republican incumbent. 
 
 123 See H.B. 1137, 152d Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (Ga. 2006) (specifically changing House Districts 5, 12, 
46, 48, 50, 51, 167, and 179, while leaving all other districts intact); see also infra figs.3 & 4 (documenting the 
changes in Districts 46, 48, 50, and 51 in the Atlanta metropolitan area). 
 124 Sonji Jacobs, Legislature 2006: GOP Denies Self-Serving Remap, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 22, 2006, 
at B3. 
 125 See id. (“Democrats contend that HB 1137 is targeted toward a likely race later this year between Rep. 
Harry Geisinger (R-Roswell) and Jan Hackney, a Democrat.”).  Compare fig.3 infra (2004 Georgia House 
Districts in Atlanta area), with fig.4 infra (2006 Georgia House Districts in Atlanta area). 
 126 Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia Election Results, Official Results of the Tuesday, November 2, 
2004 General Election, http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/election_results/2004_1102/120.htm (last visited July 
14, 2009). 
 127 Michael Hill, The Middle-of-the-Roaders Get Their Turn; Political Scientist Says Last Week’s Election 
Results Showed the Benefits of Counting on Consensus Instead of Polarization, BALT. SUN, Nov. 12, 2006, at 
1F. 
 128 Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia Election Results, Official Results of the Tuesday, November 07, 
2006 General Election, http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/election_results/2006_1107/133.htm (last visited Jul. 
14, 2009) (showing election results for State Senate, District 46). . Geisinger himself sponsored the bill that 
changed the boundaries of his district.  Jacobs, supra note 124, at B3. 
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Figure 3: Georgia House Districts 46 and 48 in the Atlanta Area in 2004 
Source: Georgia Redistricting Services Office, Carl Vinson Institute of Government, 
Atlanta, Georgia. 
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Figure 4: Georgia House Districts 46 and 48 in the Atlanta Area in 2006 
 
Source: Georgia Redistricting Services Office, Carl Vinson Institute of Government, 
Atlanta, Georgia. 
C. Pitfalls and Potential: The Future of Pinpoint Redistricting 
Pinpoint redistricting has several negative effects on the democratic 
process.  As the Supreme Court has recognized, stability is crucial to an 
effective democratic system.129  Untimely and isolated changes to district 
boundaries disrupt and destabilize established electoral boundaries, causing 
disorder among voters and making politicians less accountable to the people 
who elected them as certain geographical areas are shifted out of their 
 
 129 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 583 (1964) (noting that “[l]imitations on the frequency of 
reapportionment are justified by the need for stability and continuity in the organization of the legislative 
system” (emphasis added)).  Samuel Issacharoff has more recently written that “a number of Supreme Court 
opinions express concern with the stability of the political order.”  Issacharoff, supra note 57, at 234. 
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districts.130  Changing the boundary lines of isolated districts creates voter 
confusion, especially if the changes are increasingly frequent.131  Politicians 
become less aware of who their constituents are and attempt to appeal to voters 
that will come within the new boundaries in upcoming elections rather than 
those they were elected to represent.132 
Perhaps most significant, pinpoint redistricting encourages a public 
perception that the democratic process is illegitimate or rigged.133  The 
manipulation of an individual district with no discernable purpose other than 
partisanship decreases voters’ confidence in the relevance of their votes and 
the system itself.134  In Georgia, for example, Athens voters affected by 
pinpoint redistricting felt manipulated and “helpless” as they made futile 
efforts to halt the state legislature’s partisan efforts.135  Pinpoint redistricting 
opens the door for politicians to engage in consistent manipulation of their 
constituencies, fueling the public’s disillusionment with a system perceived to 
be controlled by self-serving politicians.136  As one article notes, “Popular 
acquiescence in and support for laws in a democracy . . . depends on the faith 
on the part of the losers in this legislative election that they have a fair chance 
 
 130 Issacharoff, supra note 56, at 629–30.  Political expert Norman J. Ornstein commented on mid-decade 
redistricting’s “profound” effect on the voters and the political process: “If you don’t know from election to 
election who your representative is, because your district may change, and may change two or three times, it 
makes for any sense of accountability in this process being, basically, devastated.”  Morning Edition: Supreme 
Court Gives States Redistricting Leeway (NPR radio broadcast June 29, 2006), available at http://www.npr. 
org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=5520371. 
 131 See Levitt & McDonald, supra note 97, at 1277 (noting that frequent redistricting could “foster 
confusion among voters”).  Furthermore, in a case addressing the rights of political parties, the Supreme Court 
recognized that “preventing voter confusion” is a legitimate state interest.  Tashjian v. Republican Party of 
Conn., 479 U.S. 208, 221–22 (1986). 
 132 See People ex rel. Salazar v. Davidson, 79 P.3d 1221, 1242 (Colo. 2003) (observing that, when district 
boundaries are shifted, “a congressperson [will] be torn between effectively representing the current 
constituents and currying the favor of future constituents”). 
 133 Justice Kennedy acknowledged the “unfortunate” validity of this concern in his concurrence to Vieth, 
quoting a North Carolina state senator as saying, “We are in the business of rigging elections.”  Vieth v. 
Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 317 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 134 See J. Gerald Hebert & David G. Vance, Redistricting Must Be Fixed Before Census, ROLL CALL, July 
29, 2008, at 4 (observing that excessive gerrymandering “fuel[s] voter apathy”). 
 135 Brandon Larrabee, Democrats Seek End to Redistricting Fights, AUGUSTA CHRON., Feb. 6, 2006, at 
2B.  A retired teacher from Athens who accompanied local officials to the state capitol to protest the pinpoint 
redistricting said, “We feel like something’s been done to us.”  Id. 
 136 See Powe & Bickerstaff, supra note 89, at 65 (“LULAC opens the door to rolling redistricting and not 
only on the Congressional level. . . .  Politicians [at any level] will walk through that opening and this will 
exacerbate the corrosive cynicism that Americans have acquired believing that politics is rigged by and for the 
politicians.”). 
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to be the victors in the next.”137  When political actors engage in active and 
untimely manipulation of a district’s boundaries between elections, the result is 
the loss of that faith through public disillusion and mistrust of the democratic 
system.138 
Pinpoint redistricting is an especially attractive tactic to politically-minded 
legislators because of its subtlety—through pinpoint redistricting, politicians 
can accomplish their partisan goals without accountability to an entire state’s 
voters.139  A party conducting a statewide mid-decade redistricting will 
inevitably face a firestorm of controversy and negative publicity.140  In fact, 
fear of a political backlash can cause politicians to hesitate before engaging in 
a politically risky statewide mid-decade redistricting.141  Isolating the 
gerrymander to a few districts, however, limits the controversy, localizing the 
outrage to the affected districts.142  Engaging in pinpoint redistricting allows 
politicians to accomplish their political goals through redrawing districts while 
avoiding the accountability that accompanies statewide partisan 
gerrymanders.143  The use of redistricting software makes this process even 
 
 137 Backstrom et al., supra note 48, at 148.  The authors continued, “If gerrymandering has unfairly made 
much more likely an erstwhile majority’s ten-year control of the legislature, this consensus would be lost, and 
the result would be corrosive of the political compact.”  Id.  That criticism is even more relevant when 
considered in the context of consistent manipulation of a district throughout a decade rather than just at its 
outset. 
 138 The use of pinpoint redistricting for political gain is particularly relevant in the context of preventing 
corruption or the appearance of corruption in the political process.  The Supreme Court recognized the 
importance of preventing corruption, or the appearance of corruption, in its decisions regarding campaign 
finance legislation.  McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 540 U.S. 93, 136–37 (2003); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 
U.S. 1, 26–27 (1976). 
 139 See Daniel H. Lowenstein, Vieth’s Gap: Has the Supreme Court Gone from Bad to Worse on Partisan 
Gerrymandering?, 14 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 367, 387 (2005) (“For the ordinary citizen, the shifting of a 
few legislative seats is a matter of small consequence.”). 
 140 See BICKERSTAFF, supra note 74, at 122–23 (describing the almost universal condemnation of the 
Texas mid-decade redistricting proposal by the local and national press in 2003); Louis Jacobson, Back to the 
Redrawing Board?, 35 NAT’L J. 1173, 1174 (2003) (observing that “voters generally seem to view undertaking 
a new round of redistricting [mid-decade] as unseemly”). 
 141 See Jacobson, supra note 140, at 1174–75 (discussing how widespread criticism makes many 
politicians wary of engaging in or publicizing mid-decade redistricting). 
 142 See Jim Thompson, Editorial, Thompson: Kidd Just Might Have “Right Stuff” for Senate Run, ATHENS 
BANNER-HERALD, Mar. 5, 2006, at A8 (reporting that visiting State Senators supporting the pinpoint 
redistricting of an Athens district “found . . . a community stirred up about the redistricting.  What they didn’t 
find was the massive community support which, I’m convinced, [Republican State Senator Ralph] Hudgens 
had told them was there for the proposal”). 
 143 For example, the Georgia redistricting that redrew the statewide congressional districts in 2005 caused 
a major uproar in the state, attracting extensive press coverage and public debate.  By contrast, the state 
legislature’s 2006 pinpoint redistricting of Senate District 46 attracted barely any attention other than 
discontent in the affected districts.  Compare Lauren W. Whittington, Perdue Signs New Congressional Map, 
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easier; a click of a mouse can show how district lines can be most effectively 
manipulated to alter the partisan balance of power.144 
Political signals indicate that the use of pinpoint redistricting will grow in 
the coming years.  In the specific context of Georgia’s pinpoint redistricting, 
Professor Michael McDonald suggests that it is likely that other states with 
single party control of the state legislature and governor’s office (similar to 
Georgia) will attempt isolated redistrictings aimed at single districts or 
candidates.145  In response to Republican mid-decade redistrictings of federal 
congressional districts in Texas and Georgia, Democrats threatened to retaliate 
with pinpoint redistricting in states they controlled, including a proposed 
pinpoint redistricting to unseat a vulnerable Republican incumbent in New 
Mexico.146  As the likelihood of pinpoint redistricting increases, courts must 
adapt the political gerrymandering claim to meet the district-specific 
circumstances of this new trend. 
 
ROLL CALL, May 4, 2005, at 11 (discussing widespread discussion and controversy among Georgia political 
figures over statewide mid-decade redistricting), with Democrats Protest Athens Redistricting, MACON 
TELEGRAPH, Jan. 24, 2006, at 9B (observing political protest over the Georgia pinpoint redistricting among 
citizens and politicians of Athens, Georgia).  For further discussion of how pinpoint redistricting’s lack of 
accountability to a state’s voters undermines the legal rationale for judicial noninterference with partisan 
gerrymandering, see infra Part III.B. 
 144 See Sasha Abramsky, The Redistricting Wars, NATION, Dec. 29, 2003, at 15, 18 (quoting Howard 
Simkowitz, the product manager of a high-tech redistricting software program, as saying, “It’s become a lot 
easier to build districts that are lopsided districts, because people can understand the data so much better.  
You’re able to really manipulate the data quickly, to try different scenarios, to move the boundaries around and 
see what that means.”). 
 145 Professor McDonald wrote: 
Recently, Georgia enacted a new state Senate map that modified the existing state legislative-
approved map.  This new map was designed to cripple the election chances of a single Democrat 
living in the University of Georgia area.  Given how easy it is now to draw maps, this sort of 
activity is likely to continue in states with unified government and no prohibition on mid-decade 
redistricting. 
McDonald, supra note 91, at 4. 
 146 See Chris Cillizza, Democrats Eye Remap Payback; Leaders Target Illinois, N.M., ROLL CALL, Feb. 
22, 2005, at 1 (“[Republican Rep. Heather] Wilson’s Albuquerque-based 1st district is almost evenly divided 
along party lines and even the slightest addition of Democrats from Rep. Tom Udall’s (D) northern New 
Mexico 3rd district could tilt the balance away from the Republican Member.”). 
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III.  MODERNIZING THE POLITICAL GERRYMANDERING CLAIM: WHY PINPOINT 
REDISTRICTING REQUIRES COURTS TO RESORT TO A DISTRICT-BASED 
APPROACH 
Pinpoint redistricting differs greatly from past political gerrymanders 
analyzed by the courts.  Most importantly, its effects are not statewide, which 
distinguishes it from the redistricting plans that the Supreme Court analyzed in 
Bandemer, Vieth, and LULAC.147  When a political gerrymander centers on a 
single district,148 an assessment using the Supreme Court’s statewide approach 
is inadequate.  This Part first demonstrates that the statewide approach to 
political gerrymandering claims is ineffectual when applied to pinpoint 
redistricting, and then shows that pinpoint redistricting undermines the 
rationale for the judiciary to refrain from taking a strong stance against 
political gerrymandering.  In its final section, this Part explains that 
formulating a new approach in response to pinpoint redistricting will 
reinvigorate the political gerrymandering claim and help reestablish its 
beneficial deterrent effect.  All of these factors demonstrate that pinpoint 
redistricting should be addressed in a district-specific context. 
A. Why the Statewide Approach Is Inadequate for Pinpoint Redistricting 
Throughout its history, courts have approached the political 
gerrymandering claim from a statewide perspective, assessing discrimination 
against identifiable political groups based on the groups’ standing throughout 
the entire state.149  The Supreme Court’s first foray into political 
gerrymandering in Bandemer approached the claim in the broadest sense 
possible by looking at discrimination from a statewide perspective.150  In 
assessing whether the Indiana Republicans’ political gerrymander was 
unconstitutional, Justice White specifically cited the statewide percentages of 
votes received by Democratic candidates instead of the number of Democratic 
candidates elected,151 analyzing the claim in the context of statewide results.152  
 
 147 See supra note 18 (noting the statewide scope of the Court’s previous decisions). 
 148 See supra Parts II.A and II.B (discussing the Georgia pinpoint redistrictings). 
 149 See RUSH, supra note 52, at 73 (“Analyses of gerrymandering frequently use a state’s partisan split as 
a benchmark for measuring the fairness of a given redistricting scheme.”). 
 150 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 127 (1986) (declaring that “the claim made by the appellees in 
this case is a claim that the 1981 apportionment discriminates against Democrats on a statewide basis” 
(emphasis added)). 
 151 See id. at 115 (noting that in the 1982 elections, the Democratic share of the vote for State House seats 
was 51.9% of the vote, but only 43 of the 100 elected representatives were Democrats). 
 152 Id. at 133. 
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As opposed to looking at discrimination in an “individual district,” the 
majority opinion in Bandemer chose to focus on statewide discrimination 
against Democrats.153  Even as the Court’s approach to racial gerrymandering 
evolved into a district-based analysis over the next two decades,154 the Court 
continued to follow the statewide approach in both of its subsequent rulings on 
political gerrymandering.  Vieth addressed a Republican political gerrymander 
by examining the partisan divide in the statewide congressional delegation,155 
and Justice Kennedy assessed the degree of partisanship in LULAC in terms of 
“statewide party power.”156  Lower courts followed the Supreme Court’s lead 
and assessed political gerrymandering in statewide terms.157 
Assessing discrimination based on party affiliation through a statewide lens 
is essentially fatal to any political gerrymandering claim.  Even in states where 
one party is dominant,158 the minority party may still garner a significant 
percentage of the vote, often elects a strong minority of representatives, and is 
active in state politics.159  Because Bandemer indicates that a successful 
political gerrymandering claim must show that a political group is “shut out of 
the political process as a whole,”160 the mere presence of minority 
 
 153 See id. at 127 (declaring that “the appellees’ claim, as we understand it, is that Democratic voters over 
the State as a whole, not Democratic voters in particular districts, have been subjected to unconstitutional 
discrimination”). 
 154 See infra Part IV.A (discussing the potential use of doctrines developed in racial gerrymandering cases 
in future political gerrymandering claims). 
 155 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 327–28 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (distinguishing the plaintiffs’ 
statewide claim and emphasizing a more valid district-based claim). 
 156 League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419 (2006). 
 157 The district court in Vieth, for example, noted: 
Although [a political gerrymander] involves, to a certain extent, the manipulation of individual 
district lines, the injury is done to the entire identifiable political group.  The constitutional injury 
lies not in inequality among various individual districts, but rather in the configuration of the 
districts as a whole when they serve to disadvantage a certain class of voters. 
Vieth v. Pennsylvania, 188 F. Supp. 2d 532, 540 (M.D. Pa. 2002).  See also Marylanders for Fair 
Representation v. Schaefer, 849 F. Supp. 1022, 1039 (D. Md. 1994) (beginning its analysis of the 
discriminatory effects prong of the Bandemer test with emphasis that it concerns “statewide political 
gerrymandering” (emphasis added)); Badham v. Eu, 694 F. Supp. 664, 672 (N.D. Cal. 1988), aff’d mem., 488 
U.S. 1024 (1989) (noting that “California Republicans represent so potent a political force that it is 
unnecessary for the judiciary to intervene” (emphasis added)). 
 158 See, e.g., Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428, 442 (1992) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (noting that in 
Hawaii, “one party, the Democratic Party, is predominant”). 
 159 See Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 672 (discussing the extensive influence of the Republican Party in 
California despite being the target of a statewide gerrymander). 
 160 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139–40 (1986) (analogizing the political gerrymandering 
inquiry to the Court’s approach to race-based equal protection claims, which requires that the group be “shut 
out of the political process”).  In her concurring opinion, Justice O’Connor interpreted the controlling opinion 
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representation in government is enough to defeat such a claim.161  As Richard 
L. Engstrom observed, “[T]he effects portion of the Bandemer test . . . is 
impossible for the supporters of one of the two major parties to meet.”162  
Because fellow members of the group claiming that a gerrymander 
discriminated against them can be elected elsewhere in the state, Engstrom’s 
criticism accurately represents the statewide approach’s ineffectiveness.163 
The statewide approach ignores the actual effects of political gerrymanders.  
The victims of political gerrymanders are not the marginalized statewide 
political parties; these groups will almost certainly be represented in some 
capacity at the state capitol or in Washington.164  The real victims are the 
marginalized voters in the districts most affected by egregious partisan 
gerrymanders.  However, courts that assess political gerrymanders from a 
statewide perspective allow the rights of those being discriminated against to 
be ignored because a statewide group will still receive significant 
representation in the legislature.165  Furthermore, political groups are made up 
of individuals, and the equal protection claim itself was intended to protect 
individual rights.166  Courts taking the statewide approach overlook the rights 
of individuals, who experience the effects of the gerrymander in their own 
 
as seemingly “requir[ing] that the political group be ‘essentially . . . shut out of the political process’ before a 
constitutional violation will be found.”  Id. at 158 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
 161 Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 672. 
 162 Richard L. Engstrom, Missing the Target: The Supreme Court, “One Person, One Vote,” and Partisan 
Gerrymandering, in REDISTRICTING IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM 313, 324 (Peter F. Galderisi ed., 2005). 
 163 Id. 
 164 See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 115–16 (noting that Democrats maintained substantial statewide political 
power); League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 419 (2006) (justifying the 
2003 Texas gerrymander “as making the party balance more congruent to statewide party power,” despite 
significantly decreasing the number of Democrats in the Texas congressional delegation). 
 165 One California district court demonstrated the significance of a party’s statewide power in political 
gerrymandering claims: 
Chief among our observations is our undisputed knowledge that California Republicans still hold 
40% of the congressional seats, a sizeable bloc that is far more than mere token 
representation. . . .  We also note that California has a Republican governor, and one of its two 
senators is a Republican.  Given also that a recent former Republican governor of California has 
for seven years been President of the United States, we see the fulcrum of political power to be 
such as to belie any attempt of plaintiffs to claim that they are bereft of the ability to exercise 
potent power in “the political process as a whole” because of the paralysis of an unfair 
gerrymander. 
Badham, 694 F. Supp. at 672. 
 166 See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337, 351 (1938) (“It is the individual who is entitled 
to the equal protection of the laws . . . .”). 
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individual districts.167  Therefore, a statewide perspective to judging political 
gerrymanders ignores the true victims of the partisan gerrymander because 
assessing a party’s statewide strength says nothing about whether an individual 
district was gerrymandered.168 
The established political gerrymandering claim is even less effective at 
properly assessing a gerrymandering plan’s harms when the gerrymander is a 
pinpoint redistricting.  When the actual effects of a gerrymander are limited to 
a small portion of the state, assessing the representational harms by looking at 
statewide figures is misguided and irrelevant.  Georgia’s pinpoint redistricting 
shows the disconnect between the current approach of assessing the effects of 
partisan gerrymanders on political groups and individuals who are actually 
harmed.  The interests of Georgia’s Democratic voters, a political group that 
encompasses all of the party’s voters or affiliated members throughout the 
state, were only marginally affected by Senate Bill 386 because they continued 
to be represented by twenty-two out of Georgia’s fifty-six state senators after 
the 2006 elections.169  In reality, the pinpoint redistricting discriminated 
against a smaller group consisting of Democratic voters within District 46.170  
This particular group, which came within less than 2,000 votes of victory in 
2004,171 was genuinely affected by the legislature’s manipulation of their 
district to harm the Democratic candidate’s prospects in the upcoming 
election.172  Under Bandemer and its progeny, the pinpoint redistricting of 
District 46 would not rise to the level of a constitutional violation; the 
Democrats were not “shut out of the political process”173 because the party as a 
whole maintained some representation statewide.174  On a local level, however, 
the Democrats of the affected districts were “shut out” of the political 
process—the pinpoint redistricting destroyed the strong chance they had of 
 
 167 See supra notes 135, 142 (discussing the effects of pinpoint redistricting on voters in an individual 
district). 
 168 See Issacharoff, supra note 56, at 603–04 (observing that “a broad-level measure of statewide support 
provides little specific information about whether any particular district was gerrymandered”). 
 169 Georgia Secretary of State, Georgia Election Results, Official Results of the Tuesday, November 07, 
2006 General Election http://sos.georgia.gov/elections/election_results/2006_1107/swgasenate.htm (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2009). 
 170 See Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *7–*8 (N.D. Ga. May 
16, 2006) (explaining that the gerrymander’s effect was limited to three Senate districts). 
 171 Id. at *7. 
 172 See supra text accompanying notes 111–17 (discussing the effects of the Georgia pinpoint 
redistricting). 
 173 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132, 139 (1986). 
 174 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
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being represented in at least one of the altered districts.175  Courts need to 
address pinpoint redistricting by looking at the effects on the district-specific 
group of party-affiliated voters, rather than allowing their claim to be 
overshadowed by that party’s statewide voters, who suffered a comparatively 
marginal injury.176 
The unique circumstances of pinpoint redistricting not only permit but 
require a different analysis than the statewide approach pursued by the 
Supreme Court in Bandemer and its progeny.  When the Court allowed the 
Indiana gerrymander in Bandemer, the Court noted, “Statewide . . . the inquiry 
centers on the voters’ direct or indirect influence on the elections of the state 
legislature as a whole.”177  The Georgia State Senate’s pinpoint redistricting, 
however, only affected elections to the state legislature in three districts.178  
Where the discrimination is suffered by voters in individual districts, but there 
is almost no statewide effect, the logic of the statewide political 
gerrymandering approach simply does not apply.  Under a claim based on 
Bandemer, changes to a small group of districts would most likely be irrelevant 
because of the state-wide strength of the political party.179  Pinpoint 
redistricting must therefore be distinguished from previous political 
gerrymandering claims and analyzed under a standard that recognizes its 
unique qualities. 
B. The End of Self-Correction 
In her concurrence to the Bandemer decision, Justice O’Connor argued that 
political gerrymandering claims should be declared nonjusticiable and that 
such matters belong in the domain of state legislatures.180  Outlining one of the 
 
 175 See supra notes 115–117 and accompanying text.  Republican candidates were victorious in all three 
of the districts affected by the pinpoint redistricting.  Georgia Secretary of State, supra note 169. 
 176 See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 177 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 133 (emphasis added). 
 178 Kidd, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *8. 
 179 See supra note 165 (noting the weight a district court gave to a political party’s statewide strength). 
 180 See Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 144 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“I would hold that the partisan 
gerrymandering claims of major political parties raise a nonjusticiable political question that the judiciary 
should leave to the legislative branch as the Framers of the Constitution unquestionably intended.”).  Justice 
O’Connor brought a unique perspective to the Court’s evaluation of political gerrymandering.  Prior to her 
appointment to the Court by President Reagan in 1981, Justice O’Connor was a Republican state senator in her 
home state of Arizona.  At the time of the Bandemer decision, she was the only member of the Court to have 
served in one of the “political branches” and was intimately familiar with the partisan nature of business in a 
state legislature.  For a fascinating account of Justice O’Connor’s politics, see JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: 
INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 141–44 (2007). 
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most compelling reasons for judicial non-interference with political 
gerrymandering, Justice O’Connor expressed her view that political 
gerrymandering was a “self-limiting enterprise.”181  She believed that the 
negative effects of a political gerrymander could be effectively remedied 
through avenues other than a constitutional challenge, particularly the political 
process itself.182  Justice O’Connor explained the potential for a political 
gerrymander to be self-defeating: 
In order to gerrymander, the legislative majority must weaken some 
of its safe seats, thus exposing its own incumbents to greater risks of 
defeat . . . .  Similarly, an overambitious gerrymander can lead to 
disaster for the legislative majority: because it has created more seats 
in which it hopes to win relatively narrow victories, the same swing 
in overall voting strength will tend to cost the legislative majority 
more and more seats as the gerrymander becomes more ambitious.183 
In the context of decennial statewide redistricting, there is merit to Justice 
O’Connor’s theory of self-correction.184  Statewide gerrymanders are 
vulnerable to being overcome by three factors: (1) potential political backlash 
against the redistricting party; (2) the likelihood of the gerrymander 
overextending itself; and (3) the probability that the gerrymander can be 
overcome over the course of the decade.  All three of these realities act as 
checks on partisan gerrymandering by weakening their effectiveness and 
sustainability.  Pinpoint redistricting, however, undermines all three of these 
principles that support Justice O’Connor’s theory. 
1. Political Backlash and Accountability 
Political backlash, whether actual or potential, acts as perhaps the most 
important check on partisan gerrymandering by ensuring the redistricting 
 
 181 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 182 See id. (“There is no proof before us that political gerrymandering is an evil that cannot be checked or 
cured by the people or by the parties themselves.”). 
 183 Id. (citations omitted).  For a prophetic example that demonstrated the accuracy of Justice O’Connor’s 
analysis, see infra note 184. 
 184 Justice O’Connor’s view was vindicated by an egregious case of partisan overstretch in Georgia after 
the 2000 census, where a Democratic gerrymander actually led to the defeat of prominent Democratic backers 
of the plan and a Republican majority in the State Senate in the first election after its implementation in 2002.  
Pamela S. Karlan, Georgia v. Ashcroft and the Retrogression of Retrogression, 3 ELECTION L. J. 21, 29 (2004).  
This gerrymander was the subject of the Supreme Court’s decision in Georgia v. Ashcroft, 539 U.S. 461 
(2003).  Justice O’Connor wrote the majority opinion in Ashcroft; appropriately, the results of the gerrymander 
in the 2002 elections supported her faith in self-correction. 
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party’s accountability to their constituents.185  Public reactions to decennial 
statewide partisan gerrymandering, especially mid-decade redistricting, are 
almost universally negative.  The mid-decade congressional redistrictings in 
Texas in 2003 and, to a lesser extent, Georgia in 2005 attracted national 
attention, were almost universally condemned in the press, and met ridicule 
and disapproval from the voting public.186  Furthermore, while some partisan 
actors feel that the benefit of securing advantages for their party through mid-
decade redistricting outweighs the cost of bad publicity,187 the fear of political 
backlash causes many politicians to restrain their impulses to engage in such 
politically risky behavior.188  The potential political price of retaliating for 
Republican mid-decade redistricting efforts discouraged many Democratic 
politicians in other states from moving forward with mid-decade redistrictings 
of their own.189  Accountability to the voting public thus acts as a deterrent to 
gerrymandering. 
Pinpoint redistricting, however, destroys any significant political 
accountability to the voters because it minimizes the political backlash.  
Because the gerrymander is limited to a small part of the state, it is unlikely 
that there will be a widespread negative reaction to the legislature’s 
manipulations.  Pinpoint redistricting therefore gives politicians the 
opportunity to achieve partisan goals through gerrymandering without 
hesitating at the possibility of a public relations nightmare.  In Georgia, the 
pinpoint redistricting of Senate District 46 attracted barely any attention 
outside of Athens (especially compared to the statewide mid-decade 
redistricting of the previous year),190 and the Republicans accomplished their 
 
 185 See Richard H. Pildes, The Constitution and Political Competition, 30 NOVA L. REV. 253, 256 (2006) 
(noting the urgent need to protect “the electoral accountability of officeholders to voters” in light of LULAC). 
 186 See, e.g., Jeffrey Toobin, Drawing the Line: Will Tom DeLay’s Redistricting in Texas Cost Him His 
Seat?, NEW YORKER, Mar. 6, 2006, at 32, 37 (quoting Samuel Issacharoff as saying that the common 
perception of the Texas mid-decade redistricting is that it was a “national scandal”); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 140, 143 (discussing the political backlash against the Texas and Georgia mid-decade 
congressional redistrictings). 
 187 See BICKERSTAFF, supra note 74, at 126–27 (discussing Republican attempts to promote a mid-decade 
redistricting plan in Texas despite statewide “negative PR”). 
 188 See Jacobson, supra note 140, at 1175 (“Despite being pressured a bit by national party leaders, many 
state lawmakers seem to be taking the bad press that new redistricting proposals are generating as a warning—
even in cases where their own party could benefit from a new map.”) 
 189 See Babington, supra note 94, at A7 (noting some Democratic politicians’ unwillingness to engage in 
mid-decade redistricting in retaliation of Republican efforts in Texas and Georgia for fear of stoking 
controversy and voter outrage). 
 190 See supra note 143. 
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goal of securing a vulnerable seat.191  By eliminating any substantial political 
risk and accountability, the subtlety of pinpoint redistricting makes it even 
more harmful than mid-decade partisan gerrymanders conducted statewide. 
2. Overextension 
As Justice O’Connor explained, a redistricting party can fall victim to 
overextension when it spreads out friendly partisan voters over too many 
districts to maximize its advantage.192  While the redistricting party may be 
aiming for political advantage through such a gerrymander, districts drawn 
with only a slim majority of friendly voters can backfire as the opposing 
party’s voters are able to overcome these tenuous majorities.193  A party’s own 
ambition can therefore lead to its demise.194 
Pinpoint redistricting can eliminate this weakness of partisan 
gerrymandering.  There is little risk of overextension because the scope of the 
gerrymander is so small.  For example, the two state senate districts mainly 
affected by the Georgia pinpoint redistricting previously consisted of the 
competitive District 46 and the solidly Republican District 47.195  The pinpoint 
redistricting turned both of these districts into secure Republican seats without 
risking either one; the Republican voters brought into the formerly competitive 
District 46 came from a district where the Republican candidate won over 70% 
of the vote in 2004.196  Rather than distributing friendly voters throughout the 
state, Republican state legislators were able to pick their battlefield and shift 
the boundaries in an area where there was no risk of overextension. 
3. The Element of Time 
Justice O’Connor’s insistence that gerrymandering is “self-correcting”197 
also depends upon the element of time.  While a decennial statewide 
 
 191 See supra text accompanying notes 111–117. 
 192 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 152 (1986) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 193 See Lublin & McDonald, supra note 2, at 155 (“The failure of the Georgia Democrats, who had won 
legislative majorities with a minority of votes in several elections during the 1990s, to hold on to their majority 
in 2002 despite aggressive efforts to protect it through redistricting seemingly confirms [Justice O’Connor’s] 
assertion [that partisan gerrymanders are ‘self-limiting’].”). 
 194 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 152 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 195 See supra notes 99–102, 111–17 and accompanying text. 
 196 Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *7 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 2006).  
In 2006, Republican candidates won the races in Districts 46 and 47 by double-digit margins.  Georgia 
Secretary of State, supra note 169. 
 197 See supra text accompanying note 181. 
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redistricting can give a major advantage to the redistricting party, the variable 
of time, encompassing shifts in political fortunes, ensured that the system 
could not be permanently rigged.198  Over the course of a decade in an 
unchanged system, control of the electoral process shifts from the powerful 
parties to the people as the effects of the initial partisan gerrymander gradually 
erode through population shifts and political trends.199  Adam Cox has called 
this “beneficial uncertainty.”200  Arguing for limiting redistricting to once a 
decade, Cox observes that redistricting multiple times in a decade allows state 
legislators to consistently adapt a state’s district boundaries to prevent the 
effects of variations in voters’ preferences.201 
Legislators can do everything in their power to manipulate district lines 
most favorably to their party at the start of a decade, but their power to control 
voters over time is limited for several reasons.  First, politics is unpredictable.  
A party that has been suppressed throughout the state or a veteran politician in 
a supposedly secure district can face a sudden turn in fortune and be swept in 
or out of power by events no one could have predicted when the district lines 
were drawn.202  This happened on a national scale in 2006; many believed that 
congressional districts were so heavily gerrymandered in favor of Republicans 
that even a tidal wave of Democratic support could not give the Democrats a 
majority.203  Instead, Democrats scored victories in many traditionally 
conservative or Republican districts.204  Second, shifts in political, 
geographical, or socioeconomic factors can overcome a political gerrymander 
 
 198 Cf. Michael J. Kasper, The Almost Rise and Not Quite Fall of the Political Gerrymander, 27 N. ILL. U. 
L. REV. 409, 424–25 (2007) (arguing that the mood of the voting public can overcome gerrymandering). 
 199 Cox, supra note 70, at 772; see also Levitt & McDonald, supra note 97, at 1276 (“Natural population 
shifts over the course of a decade inject a degree of uncertainty into the broad calculations of those who draw 
the lines, and generally moderate the effects of an initial redistricting.”). 
 200 Cox, supra note 70, at 769. 
 201 Id. at 770. 
 202 For example, Republican Congressman Mark Foley represented a gerrymandered district in South 
Florida that was considered securely Republican with a very conservative bent.  Nonetheless, a high-profile 
scandal forced his resignation in 2006, and one of the more conservative districts in Florida went to a 
Democrat in that year’s election.  Josh Kraushaar, GOP Sees Shot at Regaining Foley’s Former Seat, 
POLITICO, Feb. 28, 2007, http://www.politico.com/news/stories/0207/2954.html. 
 203 See Klain, supra note 1, at 75 (noting that, after LULAC, “any remaining hope that enough 
congressional races would be competitive in 2006 to change the balance of power in the House seemed all but 
extinguished”); McDonald, supra note 91 (noting that extreme partisan gerrymandering “has contributed to a 
reduction in electoral competition to the point where we are wondering if the Democrats will win the 15 seats 
they need to gain majority control [in] the House, despite President Bush’s approval rating dropping to the 
30s”). 
 204 Klain, supra note 1, at 75–76. 
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drawn to conditions that existed at the time the map was drawn.205  Even an 
initially successful gerrymander can result in a majority for the opposition 
party several years after it is implemented.206  This “beneficial uncertainty”207 
gradually allows the voting population to overcome the manipulative actions of 
their representatives. 
The advent of pinpoint redistricting, however, eliminates unpredictability.  
Legislators can now halt “self-correcting” trends against partisan gerrymanders 
by identifying threats to their parties’ candidates or incumbents in districts that 
are showing signs of becoming more competitive and conducting the political 
equivalent of a surgical strike.  They can shift the lines of an isolated group of 
districts to eliminate the threat of meaningful competition.208  Since legislators 
can change the lines at any time and in any part of the state that they want, 
self-correction can be stopped in its tracks because elections are no longer 
unpredictable.  Pinpoint redistricting therefore makes Justice O’Connor’s 
theory of self-correction obsolete.209  Political players can undermine any 
natural self-correction by manipulating voters’ emerging chances to elect new 
representatives.210  The emergence of pinpoint redistricting has dealt a fatal 
blow to the logic of Justice O’Connor’s theory that political gerrymandering is 
a “self-limiting enterprise.”211 
C. Reestablishing the Bandemer Stopgap 
The rise of mid-decade redistricting, coupled with the Supreme Court’s 
acquiescence, allows partisan-minded legislators to redraw district lines to the 
 
 205 See Cox, supra note 70, at 771–72 (discussing the role of shifts in parties’ political fortunes, 
geographic factors, voting trends, and other influences in eroding the effects of a partisan gerrymander). 
 206 See, e.g., Frank Jossi, Blood Sport: Redistricting Promises to Be Difficult Again as Lawmakers Await 
2010 Census, SAINT PAUL LEGAL LEDGER CAPITOL REP., Dec. 8, 2008, at 3 (“[T]he myth that a plan to 
gerrymander the state could create a one-party rule doesn’t work, at least not in Minnesota.  The [Democratic-
Farmer-Labor] plan in the 1990s led to a Republican-led house in 1996 and lasted a decade.  The 2000 plan, 
created by a panel of judges led by a Republican, resulted in a dominant [Democratic-Farmer-Labor] house by 
2006.”). 
 207 See supra note 200 and accompanying text. 
 208 E.g., Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *7–*8 (N.D. Ga. May 
16, 2006). 
 209 See Pildes, supra note 185, at 275 (observing that “[m]id-decade redistricting destroys [the] inherent, 
structural check” of gerrymandering being a self-limiting enterprise); see also Cox, supra note 70, at 776 
(noting that “self-limitation is much weaker where the parties are free to redistrict frequently”). 
 210 See Cox, supra note 70, at 775 (noting that a ban on mid-decade redistricting “will prevent parties in 
control of the redistricting process from frequently adjusting district boundaries to shore up their control in 
districts where their margin of victory has eroded or is otherwise dangerously slim”). 
 211 See supra text accompanying notes 181–183. 
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smallest detail with virtually no fear of recrimination from federal courts.212  
The Supreme Court’s most recent cases regarding political gerrymandering 
make pinpoint redistricting a much more attractive option because the Court 
stubbornly continues to look at political gerrymanders through a statewide 
lens.  The LULAC decision in particular opened the floodgates for legislators to 
redistrict at will213 and practically destroyed the deterrent effect that previously 
prevented partisan gerrymanders from going too far. 
Bandemer held that an unconstitutional political gerrymander could be 
found only when a gerrymander arranged the electoral system “in a manner 
that will consistently degrade a voter’s or a group of voters’ influence on the 
political process as a whole.”214  This high threshold established what some 
have called an “unmanageable standard” for finding a political gerrymander to 
be unconstitutional.215  While Bandemer’s standard imposed a heavy burden 
for political gerrymandering plaintiffs, its ambiguity forced partisan-minded 
legislators to be cautious; at any point, the Court could have declared a 
particularly zealous partisan gerrymander unconstitutional.216  Professor 
Richard Hasen interpreted the Bandemer decision’s tack as an effective 
strategic move: by allowing political gerrymandering claims to be justiciable 
with an extremely high standard, Hasen argued, Bandemer “serves as a 
backstop (and perhaps as a deterrent) to police the most egregious forms of 
partisan gerrymandering.”217  In essence, the threat of judicial intervention can 
be just as effective as intervention itself.218 
In his 2005 assessment of the state of the political gerrymandering claim, 
Nathaniel Persily suggested that redistricters defending their plan “should 
beware of [arguing that their plan was based upon partisanship rather than 
race] because in a nearby thicket lies the Supreme Court, perhaps with a new 
rule against partisan gerrymandering that will force them back to the drawing 
board.”219  However, any deterrent effect produced by the fear of judicial 
 
 212 See supra text accompanying note 96. 
 213 See BICKERSTAFF, supra note 74, at 387 (“[T]he door has been opened by the Supreme Court for mid-
decade redistricting by state and local governments nationwide.”). 
 214 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (1986). 
 215 RICHARD L. HASEN, THE SUPREME COURT AND ELECTION LAW: JUDGING EQUALITY FROM BAKER V. 
CARR TO BUSH V. GORE 70 (2003). 
 216 See infra text accompanying note 219 (quoting Persily, supra note 7, at 89). 
 217 HASEN, supra note 215, at 71.  Maintaining this “unmanageable standard” with the option to intervene 
as a deterrent to political gerrymandering may have been Justice Kennedy’s motive for maintaining the 
justiciability of political gerrymandering claims in Vieth and LULAC. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Persily, supra note 7, at 89. 
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intervention ended with LULAC, when the Court allowed the most egregious 
partisan gerrymander on record.220  The fear of judicial intervention, which 
served as a deterrent to particularly excessive partisan gerrymanders,221 
essentially no longer exists.222  As Michael Kasper ominously put it, “after 
LULAC, the political gerrymandering claim is dead in all but name.”223 
Pinpoint redistricting presents courts with an opportunity to breathe life 
back into the political gerrymandering claim by shifting from a statewide to a 
district-based approach.  Because the effects of pinpoint redistricting are 
limited to a small number of isolated districts, courts would have to discard 
much of the rationale underlying past gerrymandering claims and formulate a 
new approach focusing on harms produced by partisan gerrymanders in 
districts rather than entire states.  This would restore the stopgap that 
Bandemer established, Vieth maintained, and LULAC destroyed.  The potential 
for judicial intervention can be revived as an important check on overzealous 
legislators hoping to redistrict the opposing party into powerlessness.224  By 
creating and applying a district-based standard to instances of pinpoint 
redistricting, the value of the political gerrymandering claim would gain a 
firmer foundation and again force state legislators to act cautiously when 
redrawing the lines. 
IV.  ESTABLISHING A DISTRICT-BASED STANDARD 
The advent of pinpoint redistricting presents an opportunity to depart from 
the statewide view of political gerrymandering claims and formulate a new 
district-based approach, which could evolve into a broader application to all 
instances of political gerrymandering.  This Comment, reacting to pinpoint 
redistricting, proposes incorporating and adapting the Supreme Court’s 
gerrymandering jurisprudence to formulate a new and effective district-based 
standard: a severe political gerrymander, identifiable by the extremely unusual 
nature of its implementation, would be unconstitutional if partisan intent 
 
 220 See supra Part II.B. 
 221 See supra text accompanying note 217 (noting the “deterrent” effect of Bandemer). 
 222 See supra text accompanying note 96 (observing that majority parties in state legislatures feel that they 
can “redraw districts to their advantage with abandon” in light of the Texas mid-decade redistricting). 
 223 Kasper, supra note 198, at 423.  In its current state, the political gerrymandering claim is largely seen 
as a lost cause.  See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 2, at 343 (observing that after Vieth and LULAC, “it is hard 
to imagine any successful challenge when the political party controlling a legislature draws districts to 
maximize its safe seats”). 
 224 See supra text accompanying note 219. 
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guided every major aspect of drawing the new district lines and the 
gerrymander resulted in “active degradation” of a political group’s electoral 
strength in a specific district through substantial weakening of the group’s 
political performance in successive elections.  Although this new standard is 
tailored to address the problem of pinpoint redistricting, it can serve as a model 
for future statewide political gerrymandering claims. 
This Part first discusses how the Shaw line of cases can be integrated into 
the realm of political gerrymandering, as suggested by Justice Stevens in his 
dissent to Vieth, and uses the unusual circumstances of pinpoint redistricting to 
create a potential district-based standard for detecting unconstitutional 
gerrymanders.  The next section proposes adapting the Bandemer standard to 
account for the unique nature of pinpoint redistricting and incorporating its 
assessment of the effects of a gerrymander into this new standard.  The third 
section looks at the views of Justice Kennedy, the most crucial vote on the 
current Court, and concludes that the specific circumstances of pinpoint 
redistricting could satisfy his requirements for an appropriate standard.  The 
final section integrates these sources into a district-based standard that would 
effectively address pinpoint redistricting and could serve as the basis for a 
more effective universal political gerrymandering standard. 
A. “Circumstantial Bizarreness”: Adapting Racial Gerrymandering 
Jurisprudence 
The most promising and appropriate source to draw from in formulating a 
district-based political gerrymandering standard is the Supreme Court’s racial 
gerrymandering jurisprudence, which now looks at individual districts rather 
than statewide plans.  Unlike its relatively weak approach to political 
gerrymandering, the Supreme Court has acted much more aggressively against 
attempts to pack and crack minority voters through racial gerrymandering.225  
State legislators, especially in states with a history of discrimination, had long 
engaged in redistricting practices clearly aimed at diluting the strength of or 
outright excluding minority voters.226  The Voting Rights Act of 1965, as well 
as its subsequent amendments and judicial interpretations, require that minority 
 
 225 Courts can better identify the harms of racial gerrymandering because racial groups are far more easily 
defined than political groups, and this has translated to a stronger and clearer limitation on racial 
gerrymandering.  RUSH, supra note 52, at 5–6. 
 226 See Gomillon v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340 (1960) (striking down an “uncouth twenty-eight-sided 
figure” in a new districting plan obviously drawn to exclude black voters from a district in Tuskegee, 
Alabama). 
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voters in these states be given the opportunity to elect representatives of their 
choice,227 which led to a number of oddly shaped districts spanning large 
swaths of territory, gathering dispersed minority voters into a district where 
they could constitute a majority.228  In the 1990s, in a line of cases emanating 
from Shaw v. Reno,229 the Supreme Court began addressing bizarrely shaped 
individual districts that litigants claimed were unconstitutionally based on 
racial factors.230  The Court developed a district-based standard to apply to 
these claims, declaring that race could not be the “predominant factor” in 
drawing the boundaries of the district.231  For a district to be unconstitutional, 
all other factors must have been subordinated to race.232 
The claims raised in the Shaw cases arose from obvious indications of 
racial gerrymandering through the shapes of challenged districts.  In Shaw, the 
Court recognized a cause of action under the Equal Protection Clause when the 
redistricting legislation was “so extremely irregular on its face” that it could 
only be viewed as gerrymandering voters on the basis of race.233  The 
irregularity that prompted the Court’s recognition of a potential equal 
protection violation was the extremely unusual or “bizarre” shape of the 
district.234  In essence, the appearance of a district was an indicator or warning 
sign of discrimination. 
In his dissent in Vieth, Justice Stevens wished to align the Court’s approach 
to political gerrymandering with its progress in the arena of racial 
gerrymandering by adapting the Shaw line of cases’ district-based standard to 
political gerrymandering cases.235  Stevens proposed that a state legislature has 
 
 227 DAVID T. CANON, RACE, REDISTRICTING, AND REPRESENTATION: THE UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES 
OF BLACK MAJORITY DISTRICTS 72–73 (1999). 
 228 Engstrom, supra note 27, at 11. 
 229 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 230 Id.; accord Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234 (2001); Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952 (1996); Miller v. 
Johnson, 515 U.S. 900 (1995). 
 231 Easley, 532 U.S. at 241. 
 232 Miller, 515 U.S. at 916.  Ironically, these gerrymandering claims were directed against districts that 
were drawn to provide an advantage to minorities who had been discriminated against in the past.  Engstrom, 
supra note 27, at 59. 
 233 Shaw, 509 U.S. at 642. 
 234 Id. at 644. 
 235 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 327 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that “racial and 
political gerrymanders are species of the same constitutional concern”).  Two of the other dissenters, Justices 
Souter and Breyer, also proposed standards to govern political gerrymandering claims.  Justice Souter 
advocated a five-part test that the plaintiffs would have to meet with regard to individual districts, including 
violations of “traditional districting principles,” drawing a more acceptable hypothetical district, and 
demonstrating intent to pack or crack the plaintiff’s political group.  Id. at 347–51 (Souter, J., dissenting).  
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a “fundamental duty to govern impartially”236 and argued that political 
affiliation should not be used to exclude voters from districts.237  Stevens’s 
Shaw-based proposal for a standard would invalidate a political gerrymander if 
“the legislature allowed partisan considerations to dominate and control the 
lines drawn, forsaking all neutral principles.”238 
Expanding upon Justice Stevens’s proposal, the Shaw line of cases’ 
methods of indicating potentially unconstitutional use of race could be adapted 
to craft an effective and manageable standard to detect a potentially 
unconstitutional political gerrymander.  As the Court noted in Shaw, the 
redrawing of district lines is “one area in which appearances do matter.”239  
The appearances that matter in pinpoint redistricting would not be the 
appearance of the district itself, but the circumstances under which it was 
drawn.  The discriminatory intent wing of a district-based standard would 
consist of a circumstantial analog to the Shaw cases’ rejection of “bizarre” 
district shapes.240 
To find that unconstitutional political gerrymandering occurred, a 
predominant motivation of partisanship would have to be combined with 
extremely unusual circumstances directed toward accomplishing that partisan 
goal.  This would be an analog to the “extreme irregularity” of a district shape 
in a Shaw claim.241  Those unusual conditions would be the circumstances of a 
pinpoint redistricting: a political gerrymander in the middle of a decade with 
the limited effect of changing the boundaries of an isolated district or group of 
districts.  This “circumstantial bizarreness” would apply to the Georgia state 
legislature’s unique pinpoint redistricting, which contained three irregular 
characteristics: (1) it was done mid-decade, (2) it was isolated to three districts 
rather than the whole state, and (3) the city of Athens, Georgia, known to be a 
Democratic stronghold, was suddenly split down the middle.242  These bizarre 
characteristics are indicators of a strong discriminatory intent for partisan 
 
Justice Breyer proposed overturning a partisan gerrymander resulting in “unjustified entrenchment,” in which 
a political minority is only in power because of the partisan manipulation and no other factors.  Id. at 360–62 
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (emphasis omitted).  However, unlike Justice Stevens’s proposal, neither suggestion 
draws upon the Court’s tested racial gerrymandering jurisprudence.  Both proposals therefore fail to utilize the 
most effective source for developing a district-based standard. 
 236 Id. at 341 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 237 Id. at 325. 
 238 Id. at 339. 
 239 Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993). 
 240 Id. at 644. 
 241 Id. at 642. 
 242 See supra Part II.A (describing the circumstances and effects of Senate Bill 386). 
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purposes, and present the circumstances naturally leading into the inquiry of 
discriminatory effect. 
B. “Active Degradation”: Modifying Bandemer 
The Supreme Court has emphasized that the discriminatory effect of a 
partisan gerrymander is the key to finding it unconstitutional.  As Professor 
Mark Rush put it, “A partisan-gerrymander claim . . . requires a showing that 
the representational opportunity of partisan voters has been denied or impaired 
as a result of the redrawing of district lines.”243  While the aforementioned 
adaptation of Shaw would assist in detecting the circumstances of an 
unconstitutional political gerrymander under this proposed standard,244 
Bandemer, which remains relevant to any analysis of the political 
gerrymandering claim,245 provides the only existing guidance from the Court 
on what evidence could prove discriminatory effect.246  Justice White declared 
that a political gerrymander is not unconstitutional “unless the redistricting 
does in fact disadvantage it at the polls.”247  Any evidence that would meet 
Justice White’s standard must show “consistent” degradation of a political 
group’s ability to influence the political process;248 courts and scholars have 
interpreted this language as saying that a successful political gerrymandering 
claim must analyze the results of multiple elections.249 
More than any other factual scenario adjudicated in the past, pinpoint 
redistricting can meet the requirements of “consistent degradation.”  In the 
context of pinpoint redistricting, plaintiffs can show a clear difference in 
election results in a particular district before and after its alteration, meeting 
Justice White’s evidentiary threshold requiring the results of multiple 
 
 243 RUSH, supra note 52, at 6. 
 244 See supra Part IV.A. 
 245 See Lowenstein, supra note 139, at 394 (arguing that, after Vieth, “Bandemer is still binding 
precedent”). 
 246 See Charles S. Bullock III, Redistricting: Racial and Partisan Considerations, in LAW AND ELECTION 
POLITICS: THE RULES OF THE GAME 151, 168 (Matthew J. Streb ed., 2005) (noting that one of the major 
unsolved issues in the law of political gerrymandering is “what evidence would suffice to win a claim alleging 
a partisan gerrymander”). 
 247 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 139 (1986). 
 248 Id. at 132. 
 249 As Erwin Chemerinsky noted, “[Bandemer] was clear that a single election is not sufficient.”  
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 889.  See also Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 396 (W.D.N.C. 1992) (“We 
note that in Bandemer the plurality held that the results of a single election were insufficient to establish 
discriminatory effect.”). 
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elections.250  However, pinpoint redistricting goes even further than a 
decennial political gerrymander because it actively degrades a political group’s 
ability to influence the process in a single district by building further partisan 
advantage upon a plan that already benefits the majority party.251  In addition 
to its more focused partisan nature, a political gerrymandering claim based on 
pinpoint redistricting can much more effectively show this active form of 
“consistent degradation” by comparing district-specific election results in 
successive elections. 
A new standard tailored to the circumstances of pinpoint redistricting 
should therefore reveal what this Comment terms “active degradation” of a 
political group’s standing in a single district.  The results of successive 
elections in districts affected by pinpoint redistricting would satisfy the Court’s 
long-established desire to examine the effects of a partisan gerrymander to 
determine its unconstitutionality.252  Furthermore, this modification of 
Bandemer provides a clearer evidentiary foundation than a pure adaptation of 
Shaw to the political gerrymandering claim.  Justice Stevens proposed adapting 
to political gerrymandering claims the Shaw line of cases’ idea of preventing 
“representational harms,” which defined the harm of a gerrymander as 
constituents being represented by an officeholder who felt beholden to those 
who drew the lines.253  This rationale is relevant to pinpoint redistricting, as a 
representative whose district is altered may, as Stevens feared, feel beholden to 
the party that redrew the lines solely to benefit his own candidacy.254  
However, because pinpoint redistricting affects isolated districts, looking at 
results in those districts’ successive elections gives courts tangible evidence of 
discriminatory effect.  Therefore, a standard focusing on evidence of “active 
degradation” would be much more manageable. 
The Georgia examples provide an excellent demonstration of “active 
degradation” of a political group’s influence in specific districts.  The election 
 
 250 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 68, at 889. 
 251 E.g., Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *7–*8 (N.D. Ga. May 
16, 2006). 
 252 E.g., Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 139. 
 253 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 331 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The . . . danger of a partisan 
gerrymander is that the representative will perceive that the people who put her in power are those who drew 
the map rather than those who cast ballots, and she will feel beholden not to a subset of her constituency, but to 
no part of her constituency at all.”). 
 254 See id. at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Gerrymanders subvert [the] representative norm [of legislators 
being elected by voters] because the winner of an election in a gerrymandered district inevitably will infer that 
her success is primarily attributable to the architect of the district rather than to a constituency defined by 
neutral principles.”). 
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results in Senate District 46 before and after Senate Bill 386 altered its 
boundaries show that the Democratic candidate’s margin of loss increased 
from 3.2% under the original boundary lines in 2004 to 11.4% under the 
altered district boundaries in 2006, clearly indicating that the pinpoint 
redistricting disadvantaged the Democrats of that district at the polls.255  The 
effects of House Bill 1137 provide an even stronger showing of “active 
degradation” because the results in one of the changed districts, House District 
48, involved the same two candidates both before and after the pinpoint 
redistricting.256  In both 2004 and 2006, Republican Harry Geisinger defeated 
Democrat Jan Hackney, but the margin of victory changed from a relatively 
close 6.8% in 2004 to a decisive 18.2% in 2006.257  This concrete evidence, 
combined with the knowledge that the districts were adjusted between 
elections, is a compelling demonstration of the discriminatory effect of a 
political gerrymander through results of multiple elections.258  A court 
presented with this evidence could certainly see not just consistent but active 
degradation of Democratic voters’ ability to influence the political process.259 
C. The Swing Vote: Convincing Justice Kennedy 
Justice Kennedy sits at the center of a Supreme Court divided on political 
gerrymandering.  The four dissenters in Vieth and LULAC supported taking 
some kind of stand to police political gerrymanders,260 while the plurality in 
Vieth, followed by Justices Scalia and Thomas in LULAC, argued that political 
gerrymandering is not justiciable at all.261  Justice Kennedy has effectively 
 
 255 See supra text accompanying note 117 (noting the comparison of the margins of defeat for Democratic 
candidates in Senate District 46 in the 2004 and 2006 elections). 
 256 Supra text accompanying notes 126–128. 
 257 Georgia Secretary of State, supra note 128. 
 258 As Adam Cox has observed, “continuing losses across several election cycles simply help confirm that 
the partisan gerrymander, and not other potential causal factors, is responsible for the voter losses observed in 
the first period.”  Adam B. Cox, The Temporal Dimension of Voting Rights, 93 VA. L. REV. 361, 379 (2007). 
 259 Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132, 133 (1986). 
 260 The four dissenters in Vieth and LULAC, Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, would almost 
certainly have backed any manageable standard that would provide a meaningful check on partisan 
gerrymandering.  Richard L. Hasen, Looking for Standards (In All the Wrong Places): Partisan 
Gerrymandering Claims After Vieth, 3 ELECTION L. J. 626, 627 (2004). 
 261 Interestingly, the two most recent appointees to the Court, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito 
sidestepped the justiciability issue in LULAC.  League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 
U.S. 399, 492 (2006) (Roberts, C.J., concurring and dissenting) (“The question of whether [any reliable 
standard for identifying unconstitutional partisan gerrymanders] exists—that is, whether a challenge to a 
political gerrymander presents a justiciable case or controversy—has not been argued in these cases.  I 
therefore take no position on that question . . . .”).  This implies that the justiciability of the political 
gerrymandering claim may be more secure than it was after Vieth; of the current composition on the Court, 
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straddled the fence: he sided with the dissenters on the justiciability of political 
gerrymandering claims, but wrote the controlling opinion that upheld both 
recent plans to go before the Court.262  While he has never voted to strike down 
a partisan gerrymander, it was his crucial vote that kept the claim alive in both 
Vieth and LULAC.263  Any political gerrymandering claim that goes before the 
Court must, above all else, convince Justice Kennedy.264 
Justice Kennedy has indicated that he is open to the possibility of 
establishing a judicially manageable standard for adjudicating political 
gerrymandering claims “within narrowly circumscribed situations.”265  Justice 
Kennedy’s opinion in LULAC shows that he is looking for something more 
than mid-decade redistricting, even if its predominant goal is gaining partisan 
advantage.266  However, he cryptically hinted in LULAC at what would satisfy 
his personal, as-yet-unknown standard: “The legislature does seem to have 
decided to redistrict with the sole purpose of achieving a Republican 
congressional majority, but partisan aims did not guide every line it drew.”267 
Statewide redistricting plans inevitably take numerous factors into account, 
such as geography, satisfying the Voting Rights Act, and incumbent 
protection.268  It would be almost impossible to satisfy Justice Kennedy’s 
desired standard of totally partisan objectives when analyzing a statewide plan.  
Pinpoint redistricting, however, with its limited scope, motives, and objectives, 
might meet Justice Kennedy’s proposed scenario for an unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymander.  Pinpoint redistricting is focused solely on a small 
number of districts; there are far fewer considerations in drawing the lines than 
 
only Justices Scalia and Thomas have explicitly argued that political gerrymandering claims are nonjusticiable.  
Kasper, supra note 198, at 423. 
 262 See supra text accompanying notes 66–69, 83–87 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s role in the Vieth and 
LULAC decisions). 
 263 See supra Parts I.A and I.B. 
 264 See generally John Gibeaut, All over the Map: Politics and Law Mix as High Court Weighs Jumping 
into Gerrymandering Flap, A.B.A. J., Mar. 2006, at 18, 18–19 (discussing the importance of Justice Kennedy’s 
role as the deciding vote in political gerrymandering cases). 
 265 Roederer, supra note 39, at 389. 
 266 See text accompanying notes 83–85 (discussing Justice Kennedy’s rationale in declining to strike 
down the Texas mid-decade redistricting). 
 267 League of United Latin Am. Citizens (LULAC) v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 417 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 268 See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 963–64 (1996) (discussing various factors used in drawing district 
boundaries, including incumbency protection, urban centers of districts, racial considerations, and political 
groupings); see also LULAC, 548 U.S. at 417–18 (noting that “mundane and local interests” guided the 
drawing of some district boundaries). 
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there are in statewide redistricting.269  It is therefore much easier to determine 
that the few lines redrawn in a pinpoint redistricting were solely backed by 
partisan aims. 
Justice Kennedy has also emphasized that clear proof of discriminatory 
partisan effect is key to his approval of an unconstitutional political 
gerrymandering standard.270  As the previous section demonstrates, pinpoint 
redistricting provides clearer, more focused evidence of discriminatory effect 
than previous statewide claims by comparing before-and-after election results 
in a district affected by the pinpoint redistricting.271  For the first time, 
plaintiffs can demonstrate clear evidence of the effects of a partisan 
gerrymander through successive election results in a single altered district, 
uninfluenced by election results throughout the rest of the state.272  This 
demonstration can provide Justice Kennedy with his much-desired evidence of 
discriminatory effect. 
D. The District-Based Standard 
A judicially manageable standard that would effectively address pinpoint 
redistricting should incorporate and adapt elements of all of the 
aforementioned sources: racial gerrymandering jurisprudence and Justice 
Stevens’s dissent in Vieth, the Bandemer standard, and Justice Kennedy’s 
elusive concept of unconstitutional political gerrymandering.  This district-
based standard would effectively address pinpoint redistricting and would have 
a strong focus on both discriminatory intent and effect.  Under this standard, a 
severe political gerrymander, identifiable by the extremely unusual 
circumstances of its implementation, would be unconstitutional if partisan 
intent guided every major aspect of drawing the new district lines and resulted 
in active degradation of a political group’s electoral strength in a specific 
district evidenced by substantial weakening of the group’s political 
performance in successive elections. 
This standard is specifically tailored to the factual circumstances of 
pinpoint redistricting, which can much more easily meet these elements than a 
 
 269 See Kidd v. Cox, No. 1:06-CV-0997-BBM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 29689, at *8 (N.D. Ga. May 16, 
2006) (discussing how the changes implemented by Senate Bill 386 were limited to affected three districts). 
 270 See LULAC, 548 U.S. at 418 (“We should be skeptical . . . of a claim that seeks to invalidate a statute 
based on a legislature’s unlawful motive but does so without reference to the content of the legislation 
enacted.”). 
 271 See supra Part IV.B. 
 272 See supra text accompanying notes 252–257. 
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statewide redistricting plan.  The Georgia examples of pinpoint redistricting 
would be unconstitutional political gerrymanders under this standard.  The 
Georgia state legislature’s minor changes to Senate District 46 and House 
District 48 were clearly guided by partisanship; in fact, specific partisan aims 
motivated the lines it drew.273  Specifically, the newly drawn lines of Senate 
District 46 fragmented the core Democratic constituency in Athens and the 
University of Georgia that formerly made up the base of Democratic support in 
that district274 and severely degraded the Democratic voters of that district’s 
ability to elect their candidate.275  The effects prong is also satisfied in both of 
these situations, demonstrated by the results of successive elections in the 
affected districts.  The margin of victory for the Republican candidate over the 
Democratic candidate in both Senate District 46 and House District 48 
increased from highly competitive margins in 2004 to near-landslide margins 
in 2006.276  These election results clearly show active degradation of 
Democratic voters’ electoral potential in the targeted districts because the 
pinpoint redistricting directly and substantially decreased their chances for 
success. 
CONCLUSION 
Pinpoint redistricting presents an opportunity for courts to shift the 
paradigm of political gerrymandering claims from a statewide perspective to a 
more appropriate district-based assessment.  In his concurrence to the Vieth 
decision, Justice Kennedy refused to consign the political gerrymandering 
claim to the graveyard, hoping that some “limited and precise rationale” would 
someday arise to provide a basis for a clear standard.277  The unique 
circumstances of pinpoint redistricting finally present that precise rationale for 
the judiciary to bring the political gerrymandering claim out of the wilderness 
and develop a workable standard that would provide clearer guidance to courts 
and litigants.  The limited scope of pinpoint redistricting would force courts to 
consider the impact of gerrymandering in the individual affected districts.  
 
 273 See supra Part II.A (discussing the motives of Senate Bill 386 to “crack” a Democratic stronghold and 
hurt a Democrat’s bid for the District 46 seat); see also Jones, supra note 116, at B1 (discussing how the 
pinpoint redistricting of Senate District 46 was perceived as a political ploy to help a politically connected 
Republican candidate win a competitive election). 
 274 See supra note 112. 
 275 See Levitt & McDonald, supra note 97, at 1276 n.150 (noting the Georgia pinpoint redistricting’s goal 
of “fragment[ing]” Democratic voters to harm a Democratic candidate’s chances of success). 
 276 See supra text accompanying notes 117, 128. 
 277 Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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Pinpoint redistricting emphasizes the fact that the true harms of 
gerrymandering lie in individual districts and the individuals that reside in 
those districts rather than entire states, and courts can apply that assessment to 
individual districts affected in more conventional statewide gerrymanders.  
Therefore, while this proposed approach is aimed at addressing pinpoint 
redistricting, it can provide a stepping stone for an effective, judicially 
manageable district-based standard for all future political gerrymandering 
claims, focusing on the instances in which gerrymandering does the most 
damage. 
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